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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
American cities are still significantly racially segregated. But why? Is it because 
economic differences between racial groups lead to being able to afford different 
neighborhoods? Is it because people like to live with people of similar racial and ethnic 
backgrounds? Is it because racial biases in the housing market keep many minorities in 
underserved minority neighborhoods?  Some combination of two, or perhaps all three? 
This paper explores these questions and aims to assess the influence of each possible 
explanation. 
This dissertation focuses on the persistence of racial residential segregation in 
Nashville, Tennessee. The questions mentioned above speak to the three standard 
explanations of racial residential segregation: those that attribute segregation to 
socioeconomic differences, those that attribute it to ethnocentric neighborhood 
preferences, and those that attribute it to racial biases in the housing market. Historically, 
empirical research has found little support for socioeconomic explanations of 
segregation, but some recent research has suggested that it is of rising importance (Brown 
& Chung, 2006; Brown & Chung, 2008; Chung & Brown, 2007). Housing market 
simulation models, based on the theoretical models of economist Thomas Schelling 
(1971), present a strong case that ethnocentric neighborhood preferences provide a 
sufficient explanation for contemporary levels of segregation. However, empirical 
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validation has been elusive. There is no doubt that racial housing discrimination still 
exists in contemporary American cities; however, several contemporary scholars have 
doubted the causal role of discrimination in maintaining segregation (e.g., Macy & Rijt, 
2006).  
The current study addresses this research with three linked empirical analyses. 
The first tests the ethnocentric preference model of segregation by focusing on home loan 
applications by race and their connection to neighborhood racial composition. This is 
done to assess whether the predictions of Schelling’s theoretical model of segregation 
describe homeowner behavior in Nashville accurately. The next two analyses take 
different approaches to understanding one aspect of bias in housing markets, namely 
behavior by lending institutions that may promote segregation.  One of these examines 
the role of lending institutions and whether their loan approval/denial decisions have an 
impact on segregation at the level of census tracts. The other looks at whether there is 
evidence that lenders show racial bias in their decisions to make loans to particular 
applicants, and whether lenders are more likely to deny loans for minority households 
who attempt to move into white neighborhoods. This type of discrimination, as opposed 
to “redlining” or discrimination on the basis of the race of applicant alone, could directly 
maintain contemporary high levels of segregation. All analyses control for economic 
factors.  There is no question that as long as wealth is unevenly distributed by race, such 
factors contribute to racial segregation; the question of this study is whether explanations 
based on financial factors are sufficient, or whether individual preferences and decisions 
by lending institutions make additional contributions. 
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Thus this study analyzes homebuyer loan applications to assess the intersection 
between socioeconomic resources, consumer-level decisions (preferences), and those of 
the institutions that serve as gatekeepers to home mortgage financing. By doing so, it 
seeks to identify whether institutional and/or consumer factors are maintaining 
segregation and, concomitantly, which types of intervention would be most promising in 
helping to reduce segregation. 
This paper opens with a discussion of recent patterns in segregation and its 
consequences for minority households in the US. This chapter then provides an overview 
of the three main explanations of segregation and introduces the three research questions 
that will be addressed by the proposed study. Finally, it takes a closer look at the relevant 
literature and research methods of each proposed analyses.  
 
Segregation and its Consequences 
 
 Racial residential segregation is an important urban policy issue. American 
metropolitan areas continue to be racially and ethnically segregated (Logan, 2001). While 
there are trends toward greater integration, some research suggests that spatial 
segregation, at least in some form, will be a part of the U.S. landscape for the long-term 
(Krivo & Kaufman, 1999).  
In the case of Nashville, there has been a slight decline in segregation over the 
past three decades. In 1980 the Nashville metropolitan region had a black-white 
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segregation index of 0.651, meaning that 65 percent of whites would have to move in 
order for there to be proportional representation of whites and blacks in every 
neighborhood. Over the next three decades, it fell to 0.61 in 1990, 0.58 in 2000, and 0.55 
in 2010. At this level of segregation, 55% of whites would have to move in order for 
Nashville to be fully integrated.  
Segregation has important consequences, the vast majority of which are negative, 
for minority families and their life opportunities (Acevedo-Garcia, Lochner, Osypuk, & 
Subramanian, 2003; Bullard, 2007; C. A. Collins & Williams, 1999; Cutler & Glaeser, 
1997; Cutler, Glaeser, & Vigdor, 2008; Dawkins, Shen, & Sanchez, 2005; Echenique & 
Fryer, 2007; Flippen, 2004; Grady, 2006; Grady & McLafferty, 2007; Kim, 2000, 2003; 
Krivo & Kaufman, 2004; Macpherson & Sirmans, 2001; Pulido, 2000; Quercia, 
McCarthy, Ryznar, & Talen, 2000). In one particularly thorough study, Cutler and Glaeser 
(1997) show that, for the average city, a one standard deviation reduction in segregation 
would reduce the black-white differential in educational performance, teen pregnancy, 
and employment by one-third. The deleterious impact of segregation makes 
understanding its causes an important and contentious area of research.  
 
Explanations of Racial Residential Segregation 
 
As mentioned above, there are three broad explanations of contemporary racial 
segregation: those that focus on socioeconomic differences, those that emphasize 
                                                          
1
 This was calculated using the index of dissimilarity, a common measure of segregation. 
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ethnocentric neighborhood preferences, and those that highlight the racial biases at work 
in the housing market. Comprehensive reviews of the literature on these theories can be 
found elsewhere (e.g., Dawkins, 2004).  Here, I summarize the key points and findings to 
introduce my research questions.  
 Socioeconomic resources delimit housing options. If a household has enough 
money, it can afford to purchase any house it desires; if it doesn't, some houses and 
neighborhoods may be out of financial reach. Thus some scholars emphasize how 
income, wealth and education differences between racial groups undoubtedly increase the 
potential for segregation. Accordingly, there is some evidence that the relationships 
between an individual’s SES and neighborhood characteristics may have become stronger 
in recent years (Brown & Chung, 2006; Brown & Chung, 2008; Chung & Brown, 2007). 
Historically, however, empirical research on locational attainment – that is, 
studies which look at the relationship between household characteristics and  
neighborhood racial composition and median income – consistently find that householder 
race is a far better predictor of neighborhood characteristics than their socioeconomic 
status (Alba & Logan, 1992; Alba, Logan, & Stults, 2000; Charles, 2003; Crowder, 
South, & Chavez, 2006; Dawkins, 2004; Jones, 2008; Logan, Alba, & Leung, 1996; 
Pattillo, 2005; Rosenbaum & Friedman, 2007; South, Crowder, & Chavez, 2005; South & 
Crowder, 1998).. 
 Given that household socioeconomic status has been a weak predictor of 
neighborhood racial composition, other scholars point to the importance of neighborhood 
preferences in shaping metropolitan housing patterns by race. There is evidence to 
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suggest that different racial and ethnic groups prefer to live in neighborhoods in which 
they are the majority (Clark, 2002; Clark & Fossett, 2008). Since it is impossible for all 
groups to live in neighborhoods in which they are the majority and for neighborhoods to 
be simultaneously fully integrated, it is argued that segregation is the natural outcome of 
an unbiased housing market. Computer-based models, based on the theoretical work of 
Thomas Schelling (Schelling, 1971), have provided substantiation of these claims under a 
wide variety of assumptions  (Clark & Fossett, 2008; Fossett, 2006a, 2011; Fossett & 
Dietrich, 2009; Fossett & Waren, 2005; Laurie & Jaggi, 2003; Wasserman & Yohe, 2001; 
Zhang, 2004). Some scholars, however, are skeptical of the results generated by these 
computer models (e.g., Goering, 2006). Further, empirical studies have found only mixed 
support for preference-based theories of segregation (e.g., Adelman, 2005; Freeman, 
2000). Proponents of preference-based models of neighborhood segregation counter that 
their critics have “rarely engaged Schelling’s celebrated theoretical treatments directly 
and certainly have not refuted them” (Fossett, 2006b, p. 295). 
 The lack of convincing empirical evidence for both socioeconomic explanations 
and neighborhood preference-based explanations has led a third group of scholars to 
argue that the racial biases of institutions operating in the housing market are an 
important factor in maintaining contemporary segregation. Evidence of racial bias has 
been found at nearly all aspects of the housing search, beginning with the way different 
houses are advertised based on the neighborhood’s racial composition (M. Collins & 
Galster, 1995), the way real estate agents and property managers interact with potential 
clients and the information they are provided (Fischer & Massey, 2004; Massey & Lundy, 
2001; Turner & Ross, 2005), the prices quoted to prospective residents (Turner & Ross, 
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2005), whether homes are available (Turner & Ross, 2005), and the decision of lenders 
(Holloway & Wyly, 2001; Ross & Yinger, 2002) and home insurance providers (Squires 
& Kubrin, 2006). While there exists much evidence on the presence of racial biases in the 
housing market, there is debate about its relative importance in maintaining segregation, 
especially given the decline of overt forms of discrimination over recent decades (Brown 
& Chung, 2008; Turner & Ross, 2005).  
 
Research Questions 
 
 The current study enters into this discussion about the relative importance of 
economics, preferences, and racial bias in maintaining racial residential segregation by 
asking three linked questions. The first question focuses on preference-based theories of 
racial segregation and responds to Fossett’s call for a direct assessment of the 
effectiveness of Schelling’s preference-based theory. By quantifying the effect of changes 
in neighborhood racial composition on the racial characteristics of those that attempt to 
move into that neighborhood, the first question asks: do potential homeowners respond to 
neighborhood characteristics in a way that is consistent with preference-based models of 
segregation?  
The second question asks: To what extent do the decisions of mortgage lenders 
reshape the metropolitan distribution of households by race?  This analysis will quantify 
the impact of lending decisions on the residential segregation of neighborhoods. Whereas 
question one looks at where households apply for loans, question two examines where 
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households are approved for loans – a question with very little empirical exploration to 
date. Lending institutions have the ability to reshape the neighborhood distribution of 
homeowners by race by virtue of their loan denial/approval decisions.  This analysis, at 
the census tract level, quantifies the aggregate impact of lending decisions of the racial 
composition of in-movers. 
The third question builds on the first two analyses by looking at individual loan 
applications (as opposed to census tracts) and asking: Is there evidence of discrimination 
in lending decisions and does this lead to greater segregation?   While question two 
simply investigates whether there may be factors other than preferences (i.e,, lending 
decisions) playing a role in segregation, question three asks whether there is evidence of 
discrimination in lending decisions and whether this, specifically, is contributing to racial 
residential segregation. There are three main types of racial discrimination in lending 
suggested by Holloway and colleagues (Holloway, 1998; Holloway & Wyly, 2001): (1) 
discrimination based on the race of applicant; (2) discrimination based on the 
neighborhood racial composition (“redlining”); and (3) discrimination based on an 
interaction of race of applicant and the racial composition of the neighborhood 
(“geographically-contingent lending”). While consistent discrimination against minority 
households or minority neighborhoods may not have much impact on segregation levels, 
geographically contingent lending provides a direct mechanism to maintain and expand 
current levels of segregation.  
For each of these questions I will control for the impact of socioeconomic status 
and assess whether economic factors may explain any differences in outcomes by race. 
The table below (Table 1.1) describes the key aspects of each question. The table 
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highlights whether the analysis focuses on would-be homebuyers (consumers) or lenders 
(institutions), contains a brief summary of the question, the level of analysis (whether the 
analysis focuses on census tract level patterns or on individual applicants), the key 
phenomenon of interest (whether it is primarily segregation or discrimination), the 
dependent variable, key independent variables, and type of model. In the subsequent 
chapters, I take a more in-depth look of the literature and analyses pertaining to each of 
these questions. 
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Table 1.1 Research Questions 
 
 
 
Focus Question Level of Analysis Phenomenon 
Dependent 
Variable 
Key 
Independent 
Variables 
Type of 
Model 
Analysis 
1 
Consumer 
Decisions 
Do homebuyers 
in Nashville 
apply for home 
loans in a way 
that is 
consistent with 
preference 
models of 
segregation?  
Neighborhood 
(tract) – How 
does the racial 
composition of 
applicants relate 
to neighborhood 
racial 
composition 
Segregation 
(consumer level 
decisions) 
Percentage of 
applicants who 
are white (by 
tract, by year). 
Estimated tract 
percentage white, 
estimated tract 
SES, applicant 
median income, 
applicant median 
loan amount. 
2-level 
spatial 
growth 
model 
Analysis 
2 
Lending 
decisions 
Do the 
decisions of 
lenders reshape 
the distribution 
of homebuyers 
by race?  
Neighborhood 
(tract) – How do 
loan approval 
decisions by race 
relate to 
neighborhood 
racial 
composition 
Segregation 
(institutional 
level decisions) 
Difference 
between % of 
applicants who 
are white 
and % of 
approved 
applicants who 
are white (by 
tract, by year)  
Tract percentage 
white, tract SES, 
median white 
income, median 
minority income, 
ratio of median 
white income to 
median minority 
income 
2-level 
spatial 
growth 
model 
Analysis 
3 
Lending 
decisions 
Do the 
decisions of 
lenders provide 
evidence of 
racial bias? 
Loan Application 
– how do 
applicant and 
neighborhood 
characteristics 
relate to the 
decision to 
approve or deny a 
loan 
Discrimination 
(institutional 
level decisions) 
Loan approval 
decision (1 = 
approved, 0 = 
denied). 
Applicant: race, 
income, loan 
amount, credit 
history 
instrument. Tract: 
percentage white, 
SES. 
2-level 
spatial 
logistic 
model 
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CHAPTER II 
 
SCHELLING’S PREFERENCE-BASED THEORY OF RACIAL RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION, AGENT-BASED MODELING, AND EMPIRICAL RESEARCH 
 
The preference model of residential segregation, developed by Schelling, holds 
that individual households have their own preferred, ‘ideal’ neighborhood of residence 
with regard to racial composition. When a household’s neighborhood deviates too far 
from their preference they are likely to move, or if in the market to purchase a home, to 
look elsewhere for a home. The preference model asserts that patterns of racial residential 
segregation may come about from the aggregate preferences of households, rather than 
institutional racial biases (e.g., through racial steering by real estate agents or lending 
discrimination by banks). Heretofore, the strongest support for Schelling’s preference 
model of segregation has largely come from theoretical models rather than empirical 
data. In this section I will (1) outline Schelling’s 3-part theoretical analysis, (2) examine 
agent-based modeling that use computer simulations, and (3) look at the most relevant 
empirical findings. 
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Schelling’s Analysis 
 
Part 1: Simple Line 
Schelling (1971) builds his theoretical analysis in three parts.  First he simulates 
segregative tendencies on a one-dimensional line, he then looks at these tendencies in two 
dimensions by using a chess-board type simulation of a city, and finally he looks at what 
happens when there are within group differences in neighborhood preferences. 
Schelling (1971) begins his analysis simply.  The first part of his analysis involves 
a line made up of a random sequence of plus-signs (“stars” in his paper) and zeros:  
 
  
He then models what would happen if every plus wanted at least half of its neighboring 
symbols to be pluses, and every zero wanted at least half of its neighboring symbols to be 
zeros (in this basic model, neighbors consist of 4 symbols on either side). Schelling 
assumes that each plus and each zero does not care how many like neighbors they have, 
as long as it is above this threshold. He begins by going along the line from left to right 
and moving any plus or zero that currently does not have half its neighbors (4 of 8) as the 
same symbol to the nearest point along the line where this condition would be satisfied 
(the dots in Figures 2.1 and 2.2 denote which symbols are currently unsatisfied). He 
Figure 2.1 Simple line of random zeroes and pluses, from Schelling (1971, p. 149) 
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concludes when every symbol is satisfied with its neighborhood composition. It takes two 
rounds to make every household satisfied. After the first round there are eight symbols 
that have become discontented due to the movement of symbols during the first round. 
After the second round, all symbols are content: 
 
 
While simple alternating groups of two (two pluses, followed by two zeros, followed by 
two pluses, etc.) would satisfy all symbols, he finds that the average group size (i.e., the 
number of consecutive similar symbols) is 14. This ends up with almost half of all the 
symbols having no neighbors that are not the same symbol (i.e., nearly half of all zeros 
do not have pluses within 4 symbols either side of them). Thus, in this very simplistic 
model, slight ethnocentric (or, in this case, symbol-centric) preferences (a desired ratio of 
5:4) tend to yield highly segregated outcomes (a ratio of 5:1). 
Figure 2.2. First line shows dispersion of symbols after one round of movement (symbols with 
dots have become unsatisfied), second line shows symbols after two rounds of moves (all symbols 
satisfied). From Schelling (1971, p. 151) 
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Part 2: Checkerboard   
In part 2, he builds on his analysis by using a 13 by 16 checkerboard (208 individual 
squares – see figures 2.3 and 2.4) rather than a one-dimensional line and finds that under 
similar assumptions (this time using each of the eight squares immediately adjacent to the 
symbol as their neighborhood) of slight ethnocentric preferences (once again, a minimum 
of 50% same race neighbors) result in high levels of segregation (when they are equal 
numbers of stars and zeros, each symbol has 80% of their neighbors sharing the same 
symbol as them), even though no single individual wants to live in a highly segregated 
neighborhood. Different aspects of the model are then varied including the neighborhood 
preferences of each group and their relative proportions in the model. Key findings 
include: 
Figure 2.3 Random assortment of hashes and zeroes (Schelling, 1971, p.155) 
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 When groups are equal in number and the preference for like neighbors is reduced 
from one-half to one-third, little segregation results. 
 When there are more members of one group than the other, greater segregation 
results.  
 Larger “neighborhoods” (i.e., including more than just the 8 surrounding squares) 
result in lower levels of segregation.  
Part 3: Varying Preferences 
After the two-dimensional analysis, in part 3 he focuses on segregative patterns when 
neighborhoods are fixed in space (everyone within a neighborhood considers the same 
group of households as their neighbors, rather than just those that are relatively close to 
them). On top of this, he adds complexity by assuming residential racial preferences were 
distributed differently across the population (i.e., not all whites have the same 
Figure 2.4 After symbols have been moved to areas where their preferences are 
satisfied (Schelling, 1971, p.157) 
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preferences). Some may consider this model as one that better reflects the reality of 
housing decisions. In this series of analyses he begins with a model that assumes a 2:1 
ratio of whites to blacks in the population. He then assumes that the median person in 
each group prefers a neighborhood racial ratio of one white household to one black 
household (therefore, half of the whites, and half of the blacks, prefer a neighborhood in 
which they are in the minority, and the other half of prefer a neighborhood in which they 
are the majority). In this scenario he finds that while the average person wants to live in 
an integrated neighborhood, there are only two stable neighborhood states: all white 
neighborhoods and all black neighborhoods. A variety of modifications to this model 
leads to the following conclusions. 
 In the case of more diversity-tolerant households (median household can tolerate 
a ratio of 1:2.5 same to other households) and equal numbers of whites and blacks 
(100 each) there can be a stable state in which 80% of the households live in truly 
mixed (50-50) neighborhoods.  
 However, if this model is changed so that the ratio of whites to blacks is 2:1 
(rather than 1:1) then, once again, the only stable neighborhoods would be 
completely black neighborhoods and completely white neighborhoods.  
Neighborhood Tipping 
The general pattern of results from Schelling’s increasingly complex models 
suggests that segregation is the “natural” state of affairs when there is a tendency for 
groups to prefer to not be in a minority. This is more likely to be the case when there is 
unequal numbers in each group (as is the case in most American cities) and the smaller 
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the area that is defined as a neighborhood. Segregation is likely to result under these 
circumstances whether neighborhoods are considered to be relative spaces (within a 
certain distance) or absolute (hard geographic boundaries dividing one neighborhood 
from another). Even when there is variation among the residential preferences of each 
group segregation will still result, as the least tolerant will tend to start a tipping process.  
Schelling’s theory of tipping begins with the assumption that households have 
threshold levels of racial composition that shape their decisions whether to move to or 
stay in a neighborhood. Additionally it assumes that these threshold levels vary from 
household to household. As each household makes a decision to move into or leave a 
neighborhood, they 1) potentially change the composition of that neighborhood, 2) affect 
the move or stay decisions of their neighbors, and 3) affect the desirability of the 
neighborhood to potential in-movers. Thus, there will be critical thresholds where, once 
crossed, a neighborhood’s in-movers will more likely be out-group members than in-
group members. Once these thresholds are crossed, a neighborhood is likely to “tip”.  In 
this Schelling finds a corollary that could potentially explain today’s level of segregation, 
while nobody may want highly segregated cities, a slight preference to be not in a 
minority leads to unstable mixed neighborhoods that tend to tip into highly homogenous 
spaces. 
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Computer Agent-based Modeling 
 
While Schelling’s explorations using checkerboards and symbols may be instructive 
in many ways, his analysis does not come close to resembling the dynamics of actual 
cities. Recent advances in computing power and programming have made it possible to 
run Schelling-type simulations that take into account a whole host of parameters deemed 
pertinent to the study of neighborhood racial patterning. The most advanced example of 
this is Fossett’s SimSeg program that was examined in a 2006 special issue of the Journal 
of Mathematical Sociology (on the 35
th
 anniversary of that same journal’s publication of 
the seminal Schelling paper discussed above). 
Fossett (2006) described his SimSeg program working as follows:  
1. The program creates a virtual city composed of bounded neighborhoods arranged 
in a grid. Each neighborhood contains a sub grid of a fixed number of houses. 
2. The program creates housing units of varying quality and fills each subgrid with 
these houses. 
3. The program creates a population of households with each household having an 
ethnic status and socioeconomic status (simplified to a number representing 
household income). Each household also has a specific preference for housing 
quality, neighborhood socioeconomic status, and neighborhood ethnic 
composition. 
4. These households are randomly assigned to housing units, but only to housing 
units they can afford. 
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5. The program calculates the level of segregation that exists at the beginning and 
these measures are stored as a baseline measure. 
6. The simulation commences by selecting households at random and these 
households conduct a limited search to see if they can find a housing unit that 
better meets their set of housing quality, neighborhood status, and ethnic 
composition preferences. 
7. This repeats for a designated number of cycles and takes periodic measures of 
segregation to measure change from the baseline measurement. 
Fossett begins his 2006 paper by using his program to examine whether SES 
differences could explain segregation. He then turns to five more models that analyze 
what happens to levels of segregation under different neighborhood racial composition 
preferences.  The population demographics for all of his analyses consist of 60% white 
households, 20% black households and 20% Hispanic households.  
Model 1: Socioeconomic Status Differences 
In his examination of whether socioeconomic status differences could explain 
segregation, Fossett tests what would happen if households cared only about housing 
quality and neighborhood status and not ethnic composition. To test whether 
socioeconomic status (“income”) differences would lead to segregation, Fossett sets 
housing value to vary with distance from the center of the “city” (so the neighborhoods 
furthest away have the highest average values) and then sets the median income for 
Hispanic households at 75% of the white median income, and black households at 63% 
of white median income. At the outset, segregation is low and after 30 cycles it remains 
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low, with an average normed index of dissimilarity (ID) of 0.14
2
. These results lead 
Fossett to suggest that economic segregation may not provide a good explanation for 
racial segregation.  
Models 2 and 3: In-Group Preferences in Line with Survey Data 
In the next series of models he tests what would happen under varying levels of 
ethnocentric preferences. Fossett begins with two models that he argues have preference 
schedules that are in line with those found in survey research. The only difference 
between Models 2 and 3 is the way households look at their neighborhoods. Households 
in Model 2 consider neighborhoods to be fixed in space (all households in a 
neighborhood grid consider each other neighbors), while households in Model 3 take into 
consideration only nearby neighbors within a fixed distance (which may cross the 
“neighborhood grid” boundaries). 
For these models, Fossett sets median preference at 90% same race/ethnicity for 
whites and 50% same race/ethnicity for blacks and Hispanics. This, Fossett suggests, is 
consistent with what is found in survey research. Fossett sets minority preference for out-
group neighborhood composition to be 30% and both black and Hispanic prefer their out-
group neighbors to be white (this is also in line with survey research).The out-group 
preferences are subordinate to their in-group preferences, however. While whites don’t 
                                                          
2
 The index of dissimilarity (ID) provides a measure of what proportion of households would have to move 
in order for there to be proportional representation of each racial/ethnic group in every neighborhood. 
Fossett runs each model several times and reports the average ID that results. In this case, an average of 
14% of given group’s households would have to move – a number much lower than most U.S. cities. 
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have preferences for a minimum number of out-group neighbors, they prefer 
neighborhoods with Hispanic households to black households
3
.  
Both models result in high levels of segregation.   Model 2 results in an average 
index of similarity of 0.84 (84% of a given group’s households would have to move). 
Model 3, which was similar to Schelling’s checkerboard analysis, results in an average 
ID of 0.81 (although he notes that the patterning is slightly different from model 2). 
Model 4: Proportional Preferences  
Fossett then relaxes the ethnocentric preferences of each group. First, he models 
what would occur when neighborhood ethnic preferences are set to be simply in line with 
each group’s representation in the population: median white preference is for a 60% 
white neighborhood, Hispanic and black households’ median preference is for 20% in-
group neighbors (the out-group preference of 30% is dropped in this analysis). Once 
again, relatively high levels of segregation result (ID = 0.60). This is a particularly 
striking result as this set of preferences would seem to align with what should result in an 
index of dissimilarity of zero: every neighborhood having proportional representation of 
each group. 
Models 5 and 6: Stronger Out-Group Preferences   
For Models 5 and 6, Fossett assesses what happens when out-group preferences 
were strengthened, while maintaining in-group preferences at the same proportional level 
                                                          
3
 It is worth keeping in mind that neighborhood ethnic preferences are just one of three difference 
categories of preference, and therefore play only a partial role in determining where households choose to 
live (the others remain housing quality and neighborhood status) and households will move to an area with 
an ethnic mix that is not in line with their preferences if that unit meets the sum total of their three types of 
preferences better than any other option. 
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as they were in Model 4. He does this in two ways. First, Fossett sets the minority (black 
and Hispanic) out-group preference back to 30% much as it was in the earlier analyses. In 
the second analysis, he sets it to 60%. Not surprisingly, these both significantly reduce 
segregation levels. The first reduces segregation by 14 points (ID = 0.46). The second 
reduces it an additional eight points to an ID of 0.38.  
Model 7: Final Model and Conclusion 
While these lower levels of segregation result from plausible preferences, Fossett 
notes that these preference schedules depart significantly from what is suggested by 
survey data, and returning white preference to 90% white neighborhoods and moving 
minorities’ preference for in-group neighbors to 25% rather than 20% results in a 
segregation index of 0.60. Fossett concludes that the neighborhood preferences found in 
survey research are more than adequate to create highly segregated cities. 
Thus, if one imagines actual households as rational agents with preference 
schedules that fall along the lines articulated by Schelling, Fossett and others, we would 
predict that the outcome of unfettered household locational decisions would be high 
levels of segregation not unlike what is found in Nashville, Tennessee or any other major 
city in country. 
Commentary on Fossett’s Models 
Fossett’s article received much praise from the scholars commenting on his paper 
in the special issue of JMS. For example, Clark (2006) commented: “Fossett’s new 
research… is arguably the most important advance in studies of residential segregation in 
the past decade…. The paper shows clearly that preferences do matter and that residential 
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preferences and their underlying social dynamics have the capacity to generate high 
levels of ethnic segregation.” (Clark, 2006, p. 319) Similarly, St. John (2006) felt that the 
technical sophistication of Fossett’s analysis, allowing for the complexities and nuances 
unmodeled in previous research,  made for a compelling case that preferences are 
maintaining the high levels of segregation that are seen in most American cities. 
However, a third paper argues that Fossett’s conclusions do not go far enough (Macy & 
Rijt, 2006). Macy and Rijt argue that Fossett’s modeling program shows that, not only 
can preferences account for current levels of segregation, but housing discrimination, by 
itself, could not account for high levels of segregation. That is, discrimination, without 
ethnocentric preferences, is not a necessary - nor sufficient - cause of segregation.  More 
recent articles by Fossett and coauthors using SimSeg find continued support for 
Schelling’s basic conclusions on preferences (Clark & Fossett, 2008; Fossett, 2011; 
Fossett & Dietrich, 2009). 
Only one of the four commenting papers (Goering, 2006) was strongly skeptical 
of Fossett’s methods and conclusions. Goering critiqued Fossett for his reductionist 
approach to examining segregation. Goering suggested that the very things not accounted 
for by the model are some of the most crucial in understanding the patterns residential 
racial segregation. He cited the uneven distribution of amenities, capital investment, and 
disinvestment as crucial aspects of housing patterning. He argued that an analysis without 
these factors can provide little insight into actual segregative dynamics. Thus, Goering 
believes that further empirical research, as opposed to computer simulations, is likely to 
be a more productive research direction. I now turn to the most pertinent of the few 
empirical evaluations of preference models of segregation. 
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Empirical Research 
 
The analysis of Card et al. (2007) provides empirical support for Schelling-type 
neighborhood tipping. They find the neighborhood racial preferences of whites to be 
crucial in the dynamic process of tipping, and find little support for socioeconomic 
concerns as the driver of racial tipping. Card et al. use a regression discontinuity design 
to look for non-linear change in neighborhood racial composition from one decennial 
census to the next. Using census data at the tract level for 61 metropolitan areas from 
1970 to 2000, the authors find neighborhood tipping points in most cities. While 
considerable variation in tipping points across metropolitan areas exist, the results 
indicate that, on average, a census tract would tip when it reached approximately 13% 
black. Tipping was most pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s but declined during the 
1990s. They also found a negative correlation between each metropolitan area’s prejudice 
level4 and neighborhood racial tipping point: Areas with higher prejudice levels had 
neighborhoods that would tip sooner (with fewer black neighbors) than areas with lower 
prejudice levels. On the whole, the instability of neighborhood racial composition around 
the tipping points provides support for Schelling’s tipping theory. 
Even though, in general, Card et al.’s (2007) empirical research seems to support 
preference models of segregation, some of their findings add considerable complexity to 
the understanding of segregative dynamics articulated by preference theorists. First, their 
                                                          
4
 The authors use the metropolitan average of white responses to questions on racial bias from the General 
Social Survey. 
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findings demonstrate that neighborhood tipping has seemed to have weakened across 
time. This is not necessarily in line with what would be predicted by a strong version of 
the conclusions of Fossett – as long as no group wants to be in the minority, we would 
expect high levels of segregation. Second, that prejudice levels are associated with 
tipping points suggests that there is something more at play than simple homophily. If 
segregation is associated with prejudice, rather than just homophily, one has to wonder 
whether the institutions that work within the housing market are also imbued with some 
prejudice.  
To explore this question, I now turn to two studies that, instead of looking at 
aggregate change in neighborhoods between decennial census years, examine the stated 
preferences of households and compare these preferences to their current neighborhood 
racial composition. First, Freeman (2000) focuses on the differences between minority 
groups in their segregation from white households. That is, he compares the 
neighborhood exposure to whites of black, Latino, and Asian households using data 
collected from the Multi-City Study of Urban Inequality (MCSUI). Freeman asks: do 
minority groups (i.e., black, Asian, and Latino households) have equivalent proportions 
of whites in their neighborhood given similar neighborhood preferences and 
socioeconomic status. Freeman finds that neighborhood residential preferences are a 
strong predictor of neighborhood racial composition, but that black households with 
similar socioeconomic, lifecycle, and preference characteristics are much less likely to be 
sharing a neighborhood with white households when compared to both Latinos and 
Asians. That is, preferences predict neighborhood racial composition, but only to a 
limited degree. Preferences matter, but so does the minority group which one is a 
 26 
 
member. Freeman suggests that the greater segregation of blacks from whites may be the 
outcome of discriminatory institutions at work in the housing market. 
Similarly, Adelman (2005), also using MCSUI data, compared middle-income 
white households with middle-income black households and found that, while 
preferences are important predictor of neighborhood composition, white households with 
preferences for integration tend to live in neighborhoods that are 85% white while black 
households with similar preferences tend to live in neighborhoods that are 30% white. 
Adelman suggests that powerful social forces, like racial steering and lending 
discrimination, are limiting the opportunities of middle class blacks to move into 
integrated neighborhoods.  
Both Adelman and Freeman conclude that their results indicate that a significant 
institutional bias exists against blacks, which, in turn, maintains racial residential 
segregation. However, Schelling’s models predict that racial change can happen quite 
rapidly, and this is borne out in Card’s analysis. Therefore, it could be that when 
households moved into their neighborhoods they were more diverse than they were at the 
time of the study. Also, given the lack of integrated neighborhoods in most cities, it could 
be that the type of neighborhoods black households would like to live in do not exist 
(either due racial tipping as described by Schelling and shown in Card, or because of 
previous housing discrimination). However, without more empirical research on 
contemporary housing decisions it is difficult to assess the relative strength of these 
competing explanations. Thus, we have a situation in which there is a compelling 
argument that ethnocentric neighborhood preferences can account for contemporary 
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levels of segregation, but a distinct lack of empirical research that conclusively supports 
the tenets of these preference theorists.  
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CHAPTER III 
 
EMPIRICALLY EVALUATING PREFERENCE MODELS OF SEGREGATION 
 
The first research question attempts to evaluate Schelling’s and Fossett’s models 
by testing the strength of preference theory in predicting homebuyer decisions in 
Nashville over an eleven year period (2000-2010). In order to do this, I analyze the 
relationship between the racial composition of potential movers into a neighborhood and 
that neighborhood’s existing racial composition.  By using Census and Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA) data, this analysis assesses the annual racial composition of 
mortgage applicants in each neighborhood, and by extrapolating from decennial Census 
data it estimates the actual neighborhood racial composition on a yearly basis. This shows 
whether the racial composition of applicants changes as the neighborhood racial 
composition changes, exploring the central thesis of the preference-based models of 
segregation.  
The hypothesis to be tested is as follows: 
As a tract becomes whiter in its racial composition, the proportion of 
applicants applying to that neighborhood will become whiter too. Similarly, as a 
tract becomes less white, the proportion of applicants applying to that 
neighborhood will become less white. This will be the case even after controlling 
for socioeconomic changes in the neighborhood as well as the socioeconomic 
characteristics of applicants.  
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This question asks whether mortgage applicants behave, in aggregate, in a way 
consistent with the processes modeled by Fossett. By translating Fossett’s theoretical 
approach to an empirical analysis, the present study highlights a key limitation to 
extrapolations based on preference based theoretical models. It does not account for any 
processes that may bias the racial composition of applicants prior to the application 
process
5
. The Housing Discrimination Study (Turner, Ross, Galster, & Yinger, 2002) 
showed that significant levels of discrimination against minorities were occurring at 
every stage of the home search and, in particular, racial steering by real estate agents had 
increased between 1989 and 2000 (Galster & Godfrey, 2005). There is also evidence that 
potential applicants receive differential treatment by lenders based on race before 
applicants submit loan applications (Ross, Turner, Godfrey, & Smith, 2008). Thus, the 
question posed in this chapter assesses whether a Schelling-type pattern of applications is 
occurring. It cannot assess the causes of this pattern. Lack of evidence for a Schelling 
type pattern will, however, cast strong doubt upon the value of his and Fossett’s 
simulations in explaining racial residential patterning. 
To carry out this analysis, a spatial 2-level hierarchical linear model (SHLM; 
Savitz & Raudenbush, 2009) will be employed to assess how the racial composition of 
loan applicants changes as the racial composition of the neighborhood changes through 
this eleven-year period. The data have a natural nested structure, with each census tract 
having up to 11 observations (one for each year), and, therefore, are well suited to 
hierarchical modeling. The data are also spatial, with each census tract closer to some and 
further away from other tracts. Ignoring this spatial factor would lead to potentially 
                                                          
5
 Chapters 4 and 5 examine the role of institutional constraints in the housing market that may lead to 
segregation.  
 30 
 
misspecified models and downwardly biased standard errors (Fotheringham, Brunsdon, 
& Charlton, 2000). Using SHLM addresses spatial dependence by explicitly modeling the 
spatial correlation in the error terms of adjacent census tracts (Savitz & Raudenbush, 
2009). In SHLMs, the neighborhood level error is modeled as having two parts: the 
random component and the spatially dependent component. The spatially dependent 
component has three aspects: the spatial weight matrix (which delimits the proximity of 
one neighborhood to another6), the spatial correlation parameter (zero if there is no 
spatial dependence in the error term and positive [negative] if closer neighborhoods have 
similar [dissimilar] error terms), and a vector of random spatially autoregressive effects.  
More detail on the actual equations is provided below. 
 The dependent variable is the percent of applicants that are white for each census 
tract in each year. The key independent variables are the year of application and the 
neighborhood percentage white (NPW) and how it has changed over time (CPW). The 
control variables from the decennial Census data include the estimated neighborhood 
socioeconomic status in 2000 (NS; an index variable based on neighborhood median 
income, percent of persons with a college degree, percent of homeowners) and the 
change in neighborhood socioeconomic status (CNSES). The control variables from the 
annual HMDA data include median loan amount and median applicant income.  
 
                                                          
6
 In these analyses, proximity is defined as contiguous/not contiguous (i.e., the matrix is composed of zeros 
and ones).  
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Data 
 
HMDA Data 
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data provides information on borrower 
and loan characteristics from a majority of lenders
7
.  The area covered by this study 
includes Davidson County and its six adjacent counties (see map 3.1).  This area was 
chosen as it provides comprehensive coverage of Nashville’s housing market (almost 
88% of the population of the 13 county Nashville Metropolitan Statistical Area), without 
extending too far into rural communities that have housing markets that are relatively 
independent from dynamics within Nashville’s housing market.  In 2000, this seven 
county area had a population of 1,188,000 people: 77.5% of which identified as non-
Hispanic white, 16% identified as non-Hispanic black, and 3% identified as 
Hispanic/Latino.   
                                                          
7
 For detailed information on HMDA data and its uses see http://www.ffiec.gov/hmda/history.htm and  
Avery, R. B., Brevoort, K. P., & Canner, G. B. (2007). Opportunities and issues in using HMDA data. 
Journal of Real Estate Research, 29(4), 351-379. 
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From the 1,602,775 loan records in the 2000-2010 in the Nashville MSA HMDA Loan 
Application Register, I included the individual loan records where the following were 
true [applications remaining]: 
1. It was a home purchase loan [n = 657,136] 
2. The borrower was going to reside in the home [598,163] 
3. It was within a valid census tract [598,066] 
4. It was within one of the seven counties [570,879]  
5. Applicant race was reported [442,658] 
6. Loan amount was between $10,000 and $1,000,000 [439,644].  
7. I removed records that did not have incomes between $1 and $1,000,000 
[425,585]. 
After the data was opened in R statistical software, I performed the following operations: 
 I then adjusted the income and loan amount variables by inflation using the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics inflation calculator.  All years were normalized to 2009 
dollar amounts.  
 I calculated, for each year, each census tract’s median loan amount and median 
income, as well as the number of applicants and the number of white applicants. 
This new table of tract characteristics for each year formed the basis for the 
analysis (one can think of these observations as “year-tracts”). 
 To ensure that the dependent variable was calculated based on a substantial 
number of observations,  any year-tract that had fewer than 20 loan applications 
was dropped (144 observations were dropped). This resulted in 2,297 
observations (year-tracts).  The average tract had between 8 and 9 years of data. 
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Census Data 
One challenge associated with covering an extended period of time is that census 
tract definitions change.  HMDA data used 1990 census geographies up until 2003/2004, 
and then used 2000 tract geographies (inspection of 2003 and 2004 data shows that both 
1990 and 2000 census geographies were used). In general, the number of census tracts 
increases with population.  Thus, 1990 tracts that have significant population increases 
tend to split into two or more tracts in 2000 (these new tracts are often joined with 
portions of adjacent tracts, making simple 1 -> 2 relationships unlikely).  
Attaching 2000 data to the 1990 census tracts is a complicated procedure. 
Thankfully, the Census Bureau provides a table that lists every 1990 tract and provides a 
link to 2000 census tracts
8
.  This file was used to merge the 2000 data with the 1990 
tracts, controlling for the proportion of the 2000 census tract population that was within 
the 1990 census tract. More detail on how this was carried out can be found in the 
appendix at the end of this chapter.  
Once it was possible to calculate neighborhood characteristics for 1990 tracts in 
2000, I then calculated the racial composition and neighborhood socioeconomic status 
(NSES) of each neighborhood for each year. To do this, I used census tract data from the 
2000 decennial census as well as the 2005-2009 American Community Survey (ACS). 
The neighborhood socioeconomic status (NS) variable was created using a principal 
components analysis of the percentage of residents over 25 that have at least a bachelor 
degree, the percentage of homeowners, the median value of homes and the median 
                                                          
8
 http://www.census.gov/geo/www/relate/rel_tract.html 
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household income. I removed any census tracts that had missing values on any of these 
variables (6 tracts from 1990 geographies and 10 tracts from 2000 geographies were 
removed). I then used the factor loadings of an unrotated principal components analysis 
as the measure of neighborhood SES (NS). (In 2000, the primary factor accounted for 
65% of the variation of these variables. In 2005-2009, it accounted for 71%.) These 
loadings have an approximate mean of zero and standard deviation of 1. See Figure 3.1 
for a description of the results of each of the analyses. The maps show the factor loadings 
by tract, split into quintiles.  
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Figure 3.1 Neighborhood SES Maps and Histograms 
Maps are in quintiles with lighter colors representing higher SES values 
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I then calculated the neighborhood percentage white and neighborhood SES for each year 
by assuming a linear transition from 2000 to 2007 (the halfway point in the ACS 2005-
2009 data).  
Below are the summary statistics for changes between the census years, 1990 is included 
for reference purposes.  The SES portion of the table show the census-to-census 
correlations in tract SES.  As can be seen, tracts became less white across time and tracts 
tended to maintain their relative position in terms of SES.  
 
 
Table 3.1 Changes in (1990) Tracts 
 1990 – 2000  2000 – 2005-2009 1990 – 2005-2009 
Neighborhood % White  
Mean Change in %White -6.0% -3.5% -9.5% 
Median Change in %White -4.4% -3.5% -6.6% 
Minimum Change in %White -39.9% -24.3% -46.3% 
Maximum Change in %White 26.2% 31.3% 35.3% 
Neighborhood SES  
Correlation Coefficient 0.971 0.954 0.911 
 
Because 2003 and 2004 HMDA data had tracts identified in both 1990 and 2000 
geographies, they were matched against both census files. Thus, there were some 
duplicated records. Due to slight changes in census geographies, even within tracts of the 
same name, the SES variable had slightly different values across duplicates (however, the 
correlation between these two numbers was over 0.999).  To account for this slight 
discrepancy, I took the average scores when I removed the duplicate tracts. 
 The following tables list the variables used in the analysis and their 
corresponding descriptive statistics.  They are grouped into categories following the order 
in which they are introduced into the SHLM. 
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Table 3.2 Level-1 Descriptive Statistics 
VARIABLE Abbr. N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Dependent 
% of Loan Applicants who 
are White 
PCTW 2297 82.32 19.73 0 100 
Year 
Year (centered) YEAR 2297 0.19 3.07 -5 5 
YEAR-squared Y2 2297 9.46 8.78 0 25 
Applicant SES 
Natural log of Median 
Income 
LNMINC 2297 4.06 0.35 3.24 5.48 
Natural Log of Median Loan LNMLOAN 2297 4.92 0.34 4.03 6.33 
LNMINC-squared LNMINC2 2297 16.57 2.99 10.48 30.02 
LNMLOAN-squared LNMLOAN2 2297 24.33 3.47 16.24 40.05 
YEAR x LNMINC 
Interaction 
YINC 2297 0.74 12.42 -25.57 25.72 
Change in Neighborhood Percent White 
Change in Tract % White 
since 2000 
CPW 2297 -3.11 7.11 -34.7 37.18 
CPW-squared CPW2 2297 60.14 141.52 0 1382.58 
CPW-cubed CPW3 2297 -549.27 3998.33 -41780.5 51408.71 
Change in Neighborhood SES 
Change in Tract SES since 
2000 
CNSES 2297 0 0.42 -3.38 3.03 
CNSES-squared CNSES2 2297 0.18 0.62 0 11.39 
CNSES-cubed CNSES3 2297 0.06 1.57 -38.46 27.79 
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Table 3.3 Level-2 Descriptive Statistics 
 VARIABLE N MEAN SD MINIMUM MAXIMUM 
Neighborhood Racial Composition 
Tract % White in 
2000 NW 265 74.97 24.81 0.71 98.91 
NW-squared NW2 265 6234.43 2873.98 0.51 9782.62 
NW-cubed NW3 265 536520.4 299066.2 0.36 967570.1 
Neighborhood SES 
Tract SES in 2000 NS 265 0.16 1.68 -2.58 6.19 
NS-squared NS2 265 2.85 5.73 0 38.33 
NS-cubed NS3 265 7.26 30.61 -17.1 237.3 
SES Race Interaction 
NW x NS Interaction NWNS 265 35.27 139.29 -167.68 594.44 
Racial Composition Dummies 
Tract  0%-35% White W35 265 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Tract 35%-80% 
White W80 265 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Tract 90%-100% 
White W90 265 0.37 0.48 0 1 
 
Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of the dependent variable: the percentage of 
applicants in a given tract in a given year that are white. While there is diversity in the 
proportion of white applicants, the majority of tracts have 80% or more applicants who 
are white.  The relationship between the dependent variable and the key predictor, 
neighborhood percent white, can be seen in Figure 3.3.  There is a strong relationship 
between these two variables, with a correlation of 0.79. Figure 3.4 presents a scatterplot 
of neighborhood socioeconomic status and the percentage of applicants who are white.  
The correlation is strong, but not as strong as neighborhood percent white, at 0.41. The 
bivariate relationships suggests that racial composition has a stronger relationship with 
number of applicants who are white than economic status, although Figure 3.4 depicts a 
non-linear relationship between SES and the percentage of applicants who are white. This 
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trend is largely mirrored in Figure 3.5 where neighborhood racial composition is plotted 
against neighborhood SES. For reference purposes, a histogram of neighborhood percent 
white is also included (Figure 3.6). 
 41 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Applicant % White Figure 3.3 Applicant % White by Neighborhood 
% White 
Figure 3.4 Applicant % White by Neighborhood SES Figure 3.5 Neighborhood % White by 
Neighborhood SES 
Figure 3.6 Histogram of Neighborhood % White 
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The maps of key variables tell a similar story to that of the scatterplots.  The four 
maps above (Maps 3.2-3.5) are arranged in quadrants with applicant characteristics on the 
left and neighborhood characteristics on the right and racial characteristics at the top and 
socioeconomic characteristics at the bottom. One can see that the percentage of 
Maps 3.4 and 3.5 are in quintiles with darker colors representing higher Income/SES values 
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applicants who are white (Map 3.2) follows closely to the neighborhood racial 
composition (Map 3.3).   The socioeconomic status maps (Maps 3.4 and 3.5) also follow 
the overall pattern of percentage of applicants who are white, although not quite as 
closely as the racial composition.  To look more closely at changes over time, Maps 3.6 
through 3.16 show the dependent variable, percent of loan applicants who are white, for 
each year of the study.  These maps seem to suggest that each different region of the city 
has relatively consistent proportion of applicants who are white.  
On the whole, the bivariate relationships explored thus far suggest that there 
seems to be a stronger relationship between would-be in movers’ race and neighborhood 
racial composition, and a notable, but less strong, relationship between applicant race and 
neighborhood SES.  This suggests that socioeconomic differences are accounting for 
some, but not all, of the locational patterns of households by race.  
 
Figure 3.7 Applicant Income by Neighborhood SES 
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Figure 3.7 shows that the income of applicants was even more strongly related to 
neighborhood SES than the racial composition of applicants to the neighborhood racial 
composition (0.87 versus 0.79).  This potentially lends some credence to theories that 
suggest economic similarity is now more important than racial similarities in housing 
location decisions (c.f., Brown and Chung 2008).  
Non-linear Variables  
Given that Brown and Chung (2008) have recently argued that the relationship 
between socioeconomic status is becoming increasingly important, I have included an 
interaction term between year of application and the median income variable
9
. This 
interaction term should also help account for potentially changing dynamics in the 
housing market during the second half of the study period with the onset of the housing 
crisis (the squared year term should also help account for a non-linearity of the influence 
of year of application). Similarly, squared terms are included for the applicant 
socioeconomic status variables, as prior research does not indicate with the impact of 
these variables would be linear or not.  
Since the focus of this study is the connection between neighborhood variables 
and the percentage of applicants who are white, linear, squared and cubed terms of both 
neighborhood percent white and neighborhood SES are included in the model. Given the 
non-linear relationship between neighborhood SES and neighborhood racial composition 
(illustrated in Figure 3.4), an interaction term of these variables was included. Further, to 
ensure that the relationship between neighborhood racial composition and the dependent 
                                                          
9
 Following convention, the income and loan variables were log transformed to produce a more normal 
distribution. 
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variable was modeled adequately, I also created dummy variables delineating specific 
racial compositions.  The first dummy variable was between zero and 35% white, as 
Figure 3.6 suggests that there is a natural break in the distribution of neighborhoods 
between 30% and 40% white.  I term these neighborhoods “minority neighborhoods” 
given their disproportionate share of non-whites. Since the overall racial composition of 
the area was approximately 80% white, neighborhoods with between 35% and 80% white 
represented another group, which can be described as mixed neighborhoods.  Finally, 
neighborhoods with more than 90% of the residents white were deemed traditional white 
neighborhoods and represent the other dummy variable used in the models 
(neighborhoods with 80%-90% white were the reference group).   
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Map 3.6 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2000 
Map 3.10 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2004 
Map 3.11 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2005 
Map 3.9 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2003 
Map 3.8 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2002 
Map 3.7 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2001 
 47 
 
 
Map 3.12 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2006 
Map 3.14 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2008 
Map 3.13 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2007 
Map 3.15 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2009 
Map 3.16 Applicant % White, in deciles, 2010 
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Analysis 
 
The analysis used is a spatial hierarchical linear model (Savitz & Raudenbush, 
2009).  SHLM provides an elegant analytical tool for this research as it incorporates the 
information provided by repeat observations within each tract as well as the spatial 
relationships
10
 between tracts.   
Analysis Plan 
In their Hierarchical Linear Models text, Raudenbush and Bryk (2002) highlight how 
developing a model is both an art and a science. They write: “The early phases of model 
building involve an interplay of theoretical and empirical considerations. The substantive 
theory under study should suggest a relatively small number of predictors for possible 
consideration in the level 1 model” (p. 256). Following Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), the 
analysis begins by looking at the unconditional model (with no predictors) and add the 
substantive predictors in groups in order to develop the most parsimonious predictive 
model of the percentage of applicants who are white. Theoretically linked variables will 
be added to the model in groups
11
. Each variable within the group will be assessed as to 
whether it helps improve the model.  Given the complexity of multilevel modeling, the 
overall goal is to create a theoretically derived parsimonious model. Thus, variables with 
little theoretical and substantive importance and low predictive power (p > 0.15) will be 
                                                          
10
 Specifically, the SHLM accounts for the correlation between error terms of adjacent tracts.    
11
 This is based on the suggestion of Prof. Tom Smith.  
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dropped in the model building process
12
. In this study, groups of variables will be added 
in the following order (this is described in more detail below):    
1. Unconditional model (no predictors) 
2. Unconditional growth model (year variables) 
3. Socioeconomic characteristics of applicants (income and loan amounts) 
4. Neighborhood racial composition variables 
5. Socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods 
6. Changes in neighborhood racial composition 
7. Changes in neighborhood socioeconomic status 
8. Neighborhood racial composition dummy variables 
The unconditional model provides variance estimates that allow for the importance of 
time-varying versus stable characteristics to be assessed (this is known as the intraclass 
correlation [ICC]).  The next step – controlling for the impact of time – is the next stage 
in any growth model.  Raudenbush and Bryk (2004) assert that the level-1 predictors 
should be added to the model first, and so the loan and income variables are introduced 
next (first just the linear and then the squared terms) and then the interaction term 
between year and income.  When the best model has been specified at level-1, including 
year and socioeconomic covariates, then the racial composition variables at level-2 are 
included.  This is followed by the socioeconomic neighborhood variables.  It is then 
assessed whether there is an interaction between socioeconomic status and neighborhood 
racial composition.  After the most parsimonious model has been developed, the racial 
                                                          
12
 While it is clear that certain constructs may be important predictors of the percentage of applicants who 
are white (e.g., median income or neighborhood SES), it is difficult to predict the exact form and fit of this 
relationship (hence the non-linear and interaction terms included in the models). 
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change variables at level-1 are added (these would have been relatively meaningless 
without the level-2 variables included first).  After assessing the importance of these 
variables, the change in neighborhood socioeconomic status variables are included. 
Finally, as a further check to ensure that the relationship between neighborhood racial 
composition and the percentage of applicants who are white is being adequately modeled, 
dummy variables denoting key points in the distribution of neighborhood racial 
composition are added.  In its simplest form
13
, the final model would look like this: 
 
Level-1 equation: 
PCTW  =  0n + 1n YEAR + 2n  LNINC +  3n LNLOAN  + 
 4n CPW  +  5n CNSES +  ejn 
Level-2 equations: 
0n    =  00  + 01 NW + 02 NS  + r0 
 1n    =  10 
 2n    =  20 
 3n    =  30 
 4n    =  40 
 5n    =  50  
  
Spatial dependence equation:  
 r0  = pW r0 + b0 
 
The level-1 equation depicts how the dependent variable (percentage of applicants 
who are white for a given tract in a given year) is to be predicted by an intercept value 
                                                          
13
 Without squared or interaction terms. 
 51 
 
(0n) and the year of application, the median income, the median loan amount, the change 
in neighborhood percent white since 2000, and the change in neighborhood SES since 
2000. The impact of each of these independent variables is accounted for in the parameter 
estimates of 1n  through 5n. As can be seen from the level-2 equations, the parameter 
estimates for 1n  through 5n will be the same for each tract. The intercept (0n), 
however, will be estimated based on the neighborhood racial composition (NW) and 
neighborhood SES (NS) in the year 2000. This means that the predicted value for the 
intercept will potentially change for each neighborhood in the sample. The spatial 
dependence equations shows how the level-2 error on the intercept  (r0) will be 
decomposed into two components, neighborhood level random error (b0) and spatially 
dependent aspect of the data.  In this equation, p is the spatial correlation, W is the spatial 
weight matrix, and r0 is a vector of random spatially autoregressive effects. 
 
Results 
 
Model 1: Unconditional Model 
The unconditional model (no independent variables) allows for the calculation of 
the intraclass correlation (ICC).  The ICC estimates the amount of variation in the 
dependent variable associated with  level-2. The ICC from the non-spatial HLM 
attributes 87% of the variation in the percentage of applicants who are white to between 
tract differences, with the remaining 13% associated with within tract changes. However, 
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when spatial dependence is modeled through the SHLM, the tract level predictors are 
reduced to 58% of the variance, as the spatial correlation of adjacent tracts in the 
dependent variable is a striking 0.95.   
Thus, we can conclude, as would have been expected from examining Maps 3.6 
through 3.16, a combination of spatial and tract level factors are far more important in 
predicting the percentage of applicants who are white than are any factors within a tract 
that change over the study period. This suggests that, when it comes to racial composition 
of loan applicants, the 11-year study period is not long enough for major changes to occur 
in most census tracts in the Nashville area.  
Model 2: Looking at the importance of time 
Both time variables (YEAR and Y2) were positive and significant, suggesting that 
the proportion of applicants who were white increased across the study period in all 
tracts.  Including the time level variables accounted for 14% of the variance associated 
with level-1. As can be seen in Figure 3.8, there was a predicted 9% difference between 
proportion of applicants who were white in 2000 versus 2010. 
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Model 3: Introducing level-1 socioeconomic predictors 
The income and loan variables positively predicted the percentage of applicants 
who were white (after controlling for time).  The cumulative impact of a one standard 
deviation change in these variables is displayed in Figure 3.9. This figure shows that a 
one standard deviation increase in each variable increases the percentage of applicants 
who are white by about 1.7%. So a neighborhood that had a median loan amount and 
median income of one standard deviation higher than the average neighborhood would be 
predicted to have 3.4% increase in applicants who were white.  
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Figure 3.8 Impact of Year Variables on % of Applicants who are White 
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The natural log of median loan squared (LNMLOAN2) was also significant, but 
the natural log of income-squared (LNMINC2) was not.  Both the non-squared loan and 
income variables were positive and significant, with loan-squared significant and 
negative. This fuller model, including the two loan variables and the one income variable, 
explained 19% of level-1 variance, and 9% of the level-2 variance (this suggests that the 
level-1 socioeconomic aspects are relatively consistent across time and including these 
variables reduces the amount of variation associated with level-2).  An interaction term 
between the median income of applicants and the year of application was introduced to 
assess whether the impact of income changed across time.  This variable was strongly 
significant and negative, suggesting that the positive relationship between applicants’ 
income and the percentage of applicants who were white declined across time. This 
provides some evidence that socioeconomic factors are of declining importance when 
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Figure 3.9 Cumulative Impact of Income and Loan amount Variables on % of Applicants who 
are White 
 55 
 
explaining racial residential segregation. Including this interaction term increased the 
total level-1 variance explained to 24%.  
Model 4: Introducing neighborhood racial composition 
 Next, the association between neighborhood racial composition and the 
percentage of applicants who were white was tested (after controlling for year and the 
level-1 median income variables).  All three neighborhood racial composition variables 
were strongly statistically significant, with both NPW and NPW3 having positive 
coefficients and the squared term (NPW2) having a negative coefficient.  Figure 3.10 
shows the impact of the three neighborhood racial composition variables on the 
percentage of applicants who are white.  The gray dotted line demarks a percentage of 
applicants who are white equal to the racial composition.  The graph clearly shows the 
opposite of a Schelling-type tipping.  Instead, it shows a strong tendency towards 
integration. A disproportionately greater (in relation to a 1:1 relationship of NPW and 
PCTW: the dotted line) number of white households are drawn to minority 
neighborhoods.  According to the results of this model, minority neighborhoods would 
get whiter, and white neighborhoods become less white.  Including these variables 
explained 44% of the total level-2 variation and reduced the spatial correlation coefficient 
by 0.07 to 0.89. Table 3.4 shows the full results of this model. 
.  
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Table 3.4 Final Results for Model 4, 5 and the Final Model 
 Model 4  Model 5  Final Model 
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value 
  
 
  
 
  
 
 
INTRCPT 35.98607 <0.001 
 
23.30635 <0.001 
 
- - 
     NW 1.520703 <0.001 
 
1.719387 <0.001 
 
1.972785 <0.001 
     NS - - 
 
-7.59945 <0.001 
 
-12.1325 <0.001 
     NW2 -0.02089 <0.001 
 
-0.02248 <0.001 
 
-0.01805 <0.001 
     NW3 0.000115 <0.001 
 
0.000128 <0.001 
 
0.00008 0.008 
     W35 - - 
 
- - 
 
12.84962 <0.001 
     NWNS - - 
 
0.042226 0.085 
 
0.098477 <0.001 
YEAR 8.580494 <0.001 
 
9.949781 <0.001 
 
10.70397 <0.001 
Y2 0.076433 <0.001 
 
0.074812 <0.001 
 
0.047862 0.005 
LNMINC 8.786581 <0.001 
 
9.814649 <0.001 
 
9.064786 <0.001 
LNMLOAN 53.79351 0.002 
 
4.527549 0.004 
 
- - 
LNMLOAN2 -5.3045 0.003 
 
- - 
 
- - 
YINC -1.91236 <0.001 
 
-2.27178 <0.001 
 
-2.44248 <0.001 
CPW - - 
 
- - 
 
0.252534 <0.001 
CNSES - - 
 
- - 
 
2.330402 <0.001 
CPW2 - - 
 
- - 
 
0.007387 <0.001 
CNSES2 - - 
 
- - 
 
1.52836 <0.001 
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Figure 3.10 Relationship between Neighborhood % White and Applicant Racial Composition 
(Model 4) 
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Model 5: Neighborhood SES 
Since neighborhood racial composition and SES are correlated, the next step 
introduced the neighborhood socioeconomic status as control variables. Only the linear 
term was statistically significant. Perhaps surprisingly, it was also negatively related to 
the percentage of applicants who were white. The interaction term between neighborhood 
racial composition and neighborhood SES (NWNS) was added next and it was 
statistically significant and positive. This suggests that the strength of the relationship 
between neighborhood percent white and the percentage of applicants who are white 
becomes stronger as neighborhood SES increases. At level-1, loan-squared became a 
non-significant predictor when the socioeconomic status variables were included at level-
2, so this was dropped from the model.  The effect of racial composition was slightly less 
pronounced than it was in Model 4 after NS and NWNS were included.  Figure 3.11 
demonstrates this for when NS (and therefore, NWNS) is set to zero. This model 
accounts for 53% of the level-2 variation, with the level-1 variance explained remaining 
at 24% and the spatial correlation substantially unchanged at 0.885. Table 3.4 provides 
the parameter estimates for the model.  
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Models 6 and 7: Neighborhood Change 
The neighborhood racial composition variable included until now was for the year 
2000.  Changes in neighborhood racial composition (CPW) may be an important aspect 
of the decisions of would be movers.  When the CPW variables were included, CPW3 
was not significantly predictive of the outcome variable, but both CPW and CPW2 were 
significant and positively associated with percentage of applicants who were white.  The 
effect of this variable was moderate. For example, a 5% increase in tract percentage white 
would result in a predicted increase of the percentage of applicants who were white of 
2%.  A 20% change in neighborhood racial composition would result in an increase of the 
percentage of applicants who were white by approximately 11%.  This model improves 
upon earlier models and accounts for 25% of level-1 variation and 62.5% of level-2 
variation. 
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Figure 3.11 Relationship between Neighborhood % White and Predicted Applicant % White 
controlling for neighborhood SES (Model 5) 
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The change in neighborhood SES variables were included next.  As with the 
change in neighborhood racial composition variables, the cubed term for change in 
neighborhood SES (CNSES3) was not related to the outcome variable, but the linear and 
squared terms were.  Loan amount ceased to be a significant predictor and was dropped 
from the model.  This model increased the predictive power of the level-1 variation to 
26.4% but reduced the level-2 variation slightly to 61%. 
Model 8: Minority, Mixed, and All-White Neighborhoods 
Finally, I introduced the three dummy variables representing four groupings of 
neighborhood racial composition.  As mentioned earlier, the first grouping was what 
could be termed “minority neighborhoods”, neighborhoods that are less than 35% white. 
There exists few neighborhoods in the 30-40% white range (see Figure 3.6), so this 
seemed to be a meaningful gap in the distribution of neighborhoods (just under 10% of 
the neighborhoods in the sample met this criteria).  The second grouping was 35-80% 
white, which could be termed “mixed neighborhoods”: any neighborhood that has less 
than a proportional representation of whites but greater than the 35% cut-off (almost a 
third of neighborhoods met this criteria).  The third (and reference group) was those 
neighborhoods that had between 80 and 90% white (approximately 22% of all 
neighborhoods). The final grouping was “white neighborhoods” that had tract percentage 
white over 90% (37% of the neighborhoods met this criteria). 
When these 3-dummies were added to the model, only the minority neighborhood 
dummy variable was significant (it was positively associated with the percentage of 
applicants who were white).  This final model accounted for 26.3% of level-1 variation, 
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62.6% of level-2 variation and had a spatial correlation in the dependent variable of 0.9. 
The results of this model is shown in the last column of Table 3.4. 
Figure 3.12 illustrates the results of the final model. It shows the predicted 
percentage of applicants who are white (y-axis) based on the percentage of the tract 
population that is white (x-axis).  The light gray line is the predicted value based on just 
the level-2 racial composition variables (everything else set to zero).  The darker gray 
line is the predicted value when all level 2 variables are included in the model at their 
means for that particular racial composition.  The black line represents the predicted 
value when all the level one predictors are also included at their mean for that racial 
composition.  This graph attempts to show a realistic depiction of racial composition of 
in-movers based on the typical profile of applicants moving into a neighborhood of that 
racial composition.  
All lines show higher-levels of white homeowners than the overall racial 
composition when the neighborhood percent white is below 80.  Between 80 and 90 
percent white the predicted percentage of applicants who are white becomes 
approximately equal and then at the highest percentage of white residents, it dips slightly 
below.  While the relationship is not as clear as it was in Figure 3.6, it still demonstrates 
that white loan applicants are not following a Schelling-type pattern in their 
neighborhood selection.      
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Discussion 
 
The results of Fossett’s and Schelling’s theoretical models provide a compelling 
case for preference based models of segregation. Two key empirical findings in this 
chapter provide further support for the preference model of segregation. First, as 
neighborhood percentage white increases, there is a general tendency for applicant 
percentage white to increase. As shown in Figure 3.12, in the least white neighborhoods, 
40% of the applicants are white, while in the whitest neighborhoods, 90% of the 
applicants are white. Second, both neighborhood racial change variables were positive 
and significant. This suggests that applicants are responsive to neighborhood racial 
change, and white applicants are more likely to apply to live in neighborhoods that are 
becoming whiter.  
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Figure 3.12 Relationship between Neighborhood % White and Applicant Racial Composition, 
Controlling for Neighborhood and Applicant Factors (Model 8) 
 62 
 
However, when the full results of the analysis are looked at, it seems clear that 
there is little evidence for neighborhood tipping among would-be homeowners. White 
homebuyers make up at least 50% of the applicants in nine out of ten of the neighborhood 
racial composition groupings depicted in Figure 3.8.  Further, the only neighborhoods 
that have approximately equal or lower proportion of white applicants than white 
residents are the neighborhoods that are between 80 and 100 percent white.  Fossett’s and 
Schelling’s model predict the opposite of this. 
If the preference models of segregation do not provide a satisfactory explanation 
for the results presented above, can socioeconomic factors explain the patterns revealed 
in the data? The short answer is, probably not.  A one standard deviation increase in 
applicant income predicts an increase in applicant percentage white of 3% while a one 
standard deviation increase in neighborhood SES actually predicts a 20% decrease in 
applicant percent white. This suggests there is a moderate relationship between applicant 
income and the percentage of white applicants moving into a tract, but at the same time a 
strong negative relationship between neighborhood SES and the proportion of whites 
moving into that neighborhood.  The positive coefficient on the neighborhood SES x 
Race interaction term counter balances the negative impact of neighborhood SES to some 
extent. Higher SES neighborhoods are associated with a stronger positive relationship 
between the neighborhood percent white and the percentage of applicants who are white.  
That is, neighborhood SES accentuates the impact of neighborhood racial composition. 
The positive impact of SES only occurs through the interaction with neighborhood racial 
composition. If SES factors mediated the relationship between applicant race and 
destination neighborhood, we would expect neither a negative coefficient on 
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neighborhood SES nor a significant interaction between neighborhood SES and 
neighborhood racial composition. 
This study cannot test for the importance of racial biases of housing institutions, 
but the lack of compelling evidence for the two other major explanations of segregation 
suggests that it would be premature to dismiss discrimination-based theories of racial 
residential segregation at this particular point in time. 
This study highlights the empirical weakness of preference and socioeconomic 
explanations for contemporary residential racial segregation among households looking 
to purchase a home in the Nashville region over the past decade. This study does not 
examine patterns in the rental market and it could be that preference or socioeconomic 
theories provide empirically compelling explanations of locational decisions of renters.  
Nor does the study examine the racial composition of households leaving neighborhoods, 
it could be that the pattern of leavers is as, or more, determinative of neighborhood racial 
composition as the racial composition of in-movers. Both of these aspects of the housing 
market, movement patterns of renters and racial composition of households leaving 
neighborhoods, would be extremely productive areas for future research given the results 
described in this study.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
DO LENDING DECISIONS SHAPE NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION? 
 
Chapter 4 analyzes the impact of lending decisions on neighborhood racial 
composition. Chapter 3 investigated the relationship between the racial composition of 
applicants and the neighborhoods they attempt to move into, and thus aimed to provide a 
picture of the relationship between individual moving decisions and racial segregation. 
This chapter asks a similar question, but instead of focusing on the characteristics of 
applicants, it focuses on the decisions of lenders and how they relate to neighborhood 
racial composition. In order to accomplish this, the analysis will assess the extent that 
loan approval decisions reshape the racial make-up of new residents in each 
neighborhood by comparing the racial make-up of all loan applicants to the racial make-
up of those who are approved by lenders. It asks the question: do the decisions of 
mortgage lenders alter the racial composition of a neighborhood from what it would be if 
all applicants (or at least a racially proportionate number) were able to receive financing 
for their home?  Put another way, can current levels of segregation of homebuyers be 
explained by where households apply to live, or do lending decisions play a key role in 
shaping the racial landscape of Nashville’s metropolitan area? While this analysis may 
not indicate discrimination, it may show an important factor shaping segregation that 
preference-based models do not account for.  There have been a large number of analyses 
on discrimination in lending (to be reviewed in Chapter 5), there are, however, no 
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examinations of the role of lending institutions and their direct impact on residential 
racial segregation. 
The analysis will show the impact of lending institutions on neighborhood racial 
composition and whether it has changed over time. Specifically, the null hypothesis can 
be stated: 
There will be no significant relationship between tract percentage white and the 
extent that whites are favored in lending approvals. This will be true even after 
controlling for neighborhood socioeconomic status and applicant socioeconomic 
characteristics. 
 This analysis will use a two level spatial hierarchical growth model to predict the 
difference in racial composition of successful applicants versus all applicants for each 
census tract in each year. That is, the dependent variable will be calculated by looking at 
the percentage of white applicants and then calculating the difference between that and 
the percentage of successful applicants who were white. For example, let’s say 50 white 
households and 50 non-white households apply to move into census tract A in year X. Of 
those, 30 whites and 20 non-whites are accepted. Fifty percent of applicants were white 
(50/100), but 60% of successful applicants are white (30/50), leading to difference of 
positive 10%14.  Thus, in this hypothetical neighborhood (tract A), the impact of lending 
decisions led to the residents being whiter than what would have been if location was 
determined strictly by where households apply for loans.  
                                                          
14 More formally: Dependent Variable (Percentage of Successful White  Applicants in Tract A in Year X – 
Percentage of Total Applicants who are White in Tract A in Year X) = 60% - 50% = 10% 
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 Similar to Chapter 3, a spatial growth model will be used as the data have a 
natural nested structure, with each census tract having up to 11 observations (one for each 
year). That is, we have a measurement of how much white applicants were 
favored/disfavored for every year for each tract. The data have a spatial component, with 
some census tracts closer to some and further away from others. Ignoring this spatial 
factor would potentially lead to misspecified models and downwardly biased standard 
errors. 
 The key independent variable of interest will be neighborhood racial composition. 
To control for socioeconomic factors that may be correlated with race, I will include a 
variable for median income of white applicants and median income of minority 
applicants. I will also include median loan amounts in a similar manner. To further 
control for these socioeconomic factors, the ratio of the incomes (median white 
income/median minority income) and loan amounts (median white loan/median minority 
loan) as well as the loan to income ratios of both groups (discussed in more detail below) 
will also be included. The results of this study will tell us whether lending decisions are 
playing an important role in segregative patterns (increasing, decreasing, or having no 
impact on segregation).  
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Data 
 
The data sources are the same as for Analysis 1 (more detail on HMDA and Census data 
can be found in Chapter 3). After the loan application data were pulled into R statistical 
software (n=439,644), I performed the following operations: 
1. I removed records that did not have incomes between $1 and $1,000,000. I then 
adjusted the income and loan amount variables by inflation using the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics inflation calculator.  All years were normalized to 2009 dollar 
amounts. 425,585 applications remain. 
2. I included only cases where the loan was either approved or denied (rather than 
withdrawn). 326,470 applications remain. 
3. I calculated, for each year, and separately for whites and minorities, census tract 
median loan amount and the median income for the 2,601 year-tracts in the 
dataset.  
4. Since lending decisions are influenced by the borrowers’ ability to repay the loan, 
I created 5 ratio variables to attempt to control for this aspect of the loan approval 
process.  
a. First, I created a ratio of white income to minority income (INCRAT) and 
a ratio of white loan amount to minority loan amount (RATIO).   
b. Then I created a variable of the ratio of white loan amount to white 
income (ILW), and a minority loan amount to minority income (ILM).   
c. The fifth variable was the ratio of these last two ratios (ILR).   
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5. In order to create the dependent variable, I calculated the total number of 
applicants and the total number of successful applicants for each census tract in 
each year.  Similarly, I calculated the total number of applicants who were white 
as well as the number of successful applicants who were white.  I then calculated 
the percentage of successful white applicants in each tract in each year then 
subtracted the percentage of total applicants who were white for each respective 
tract and year. This created the dependent variable.  
6. I removed any cases that had either no white or no minority applicants or had less 
than 20 applicants. 2,071 year-tract observations remain. 
7. The dependent variable was examined and outliers (those with a more than 10% 
change in a given year-tract) were removed (28 cases).  2,043 observations 
remain. 
8. I then examined the independent variables and removed any cases that had 
significant outliers on any of the predictors. A number of the economic 
characteristics were significant outliers when histograms were examined. 
Removing these cases facilitates developing a predictive model that has a better 
fit for most cases, but at the expense of potentially excluding informative outliers. 
A total of 48 observations were removed (2.3% of the sample) from the loan, 
income, and ratio variables. 1,995 cases remain. 
Table 4.1 shows the descriptive statistics for each of the variables used in the model. 
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Table 4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Level-1 Variables 
 Label  N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Dependent 
Difference between the % of 
applicants who were white 
and the % of successful 
applicants who were white. 
Δ%W 1995 0.9 2.32 -9.13 9.87 
Time 
Year centered around 2005 TIME 1995 0.16 3.06 -5 5 
TIME-squared T2 1995 9.41 8.82 0 25 
Applicant Characteristics 
Natural log of median white 
income 
MEDWINC 1995 4.06 0.34 3.22 5.25 
Natural log of median white 
loan amount 
MEDWLOAN 1995 4.9 0.34 4.02 6.03 
Natural log of median 
minority income 
MMINC 1995 4.03 0.44 3.04 5.94 
Natural log of median 
minority loan amount 
MMLOAN 1995 4.92 0.41 3.74 6.45 
MEDWINC/ MMINC INCRAT 1995 1.01 0.07 0.73 1.32 
MEDWLOAN/ MMLOAN RATIO 1995 1 0.05 0.85 1.23 
MEDWLOAN/ MEDWINC ILW 1995 1.21 0.05 1 1.47 
MMLOAN/ MMINC ILM 1995 1.23 0.08 0.84 1.57 
ILW/ILR ILR 1995 0.99 0.07 0.8 1.5 
Change in Neighborhood Racial Composition 
Change from 2000 
neighborhood percent white 
CPW 1995 -3.26 7.11 -34.7 44.78 
CPW-squared CPW2 1995 61.18 148.75 0 2005.13 
CPW-cubed CPW3 1995 -561.43 4514.9 -41780.5 89786.92 
Change in Neighborhood SES 
Change from 2000 NS CNSES 1995 -0.04 0.41 -3.03 3.38 
CNSES-squared CNSES2 1995 0.17 0.62 0 11.39 
CNSES-cubed CNSES3 1995 -0.05 1.62 -27.79 38.46 
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Level-2 Variables 
      
 
 
N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Neighborhood Racial Composition 
Neighborhood Percent 
White in 2000 
NW 262 75.29 24.45 0.71 98.91 
NW-squared NW2 262 6264.68 2846.87 0.51 9782.62 
Neighborhood SES 
Neighborhood 
Socioeconomic Status in 
2000  
NS 262 0.15 1.64 -2.58 6.19 
NS-squared NS2 262 2.7 5.35 0 38.33 
NS-cubed NS3 262 6.54 27.53 -17.1 237.3 
SES Race Interaction 
NW x NS Interaction NWNS 262 33.78 135.82 -167.68 594.44 
Racial Composition Dummy Variables 
Tract  0%-35% White W35 262 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Tract 35%-80% White W80 262 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Tract 90%-100% White W90 262 0.37 0.48 0 1 
 
Below is a histogram of the dependent variable. As can be seen, it peaks around 
zero and is slightly heavier on the positive side than on the negative side (the average of 
0.9 suggests that lenders have a tendency to favor white applicants). Below the histogram 
is a scatterplot of neighborhood percentage white on the x-axis and the dependent 
variable on the y-axis (figure 4.2).  There does not seem to be a clear relationship 
between these two variables (in fact, the correlation coefficient is -0.16).  The 
relationship between neighborhood socioeconomic status and the dependent variable is 
also depicted below. There seems to be a very slight favoring of whites in high economic 
status neighborhoods, and a large amount of variation in low-SES neighborhoods 
(correlation coefficient is -0.12).  
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Figure 4.1 Dependent Variable (Δ%W) 
 
Figure 4.2 Neighborhood % White by Δ%W 
Figure 4.3 Neighborhood SES by Δ%W 
Neighborhood % White 
Neighborhood SES 
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The center of Map 4.1 suggests that there might be relationship between 
neighborhood racial composition and the decisions of lenders. The area that showed a 
Map 4.1 Average Δ%W Map 4.2 Neighborhood Racial Composition 
Map 4.3 Applicant Income (in Quintiles) Map 4.4 Neighborhood SES (in Quintiles) 
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strongest tendency to favor minority applicants was in in the heart of North Nashville, the 
historical center of Nashville’s black community (see Map 4.2). Most of the rest of the 
study area showed a slight preference for white applicants. Maps 4.3 and 4.4 show the 
strong relationship between applicant and neighborhood socioeconomic characteristics. 
 
Analysis 
 
The analysis used is a spatial hierarchical linear model (Savitz & Raudenbush, 2009).  
SHLM provides an elegant analytical tool for this research as it incorporates the 
information provided by repeat observations within each tract as well as the spatial 
relationships
15
 between tracts. More detail on SHLM can be found in Chapter 3.  
In the model building process, groups of variables will be added in the following 
order:   
1. Unconditional model (no variables) 
2. Unconditional growth model (year variables) 
3. Socioeconomic characteristics of applicants (income and loan amounts by race) 
4. Neighborhood racial composition variables 
5. Socioeconomic characteristics of neighborhoods 
6. Changes in neighborhood racial composition 
7. Changes in neighborhood socioeconomic status 
                                                          
15
 Specifically, the SHLM accounts for the correlation between error terms of adjacent tracts.    
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8. Discrete changes neighborhood racial composition 
In its simplest form (without squared or interaction terms) the final model would look 
like this: 
Level 1 equation: 
Δ%W   =  0n + 1n YEAR + 2n  WINC +  3n MINC + 4n WLOAN + 
5n MLOAN  +  6nINCRAT + 7n RATIO + 8n ILW + 9n ILM 
+  10n ILR +  11n CPW  +  12n CNSES  +  ejn 
 
Level 2 equations: 
0n    =  00  + 01 NW + 02 NS  + r0 
 1n    =  10 
 2n    =  20 
 3n    =  30 
 4n    =  40 
5n    =  50 
 6n    =  60 
 7n    =  70 
 8n    =  80 
 9n    =  90 
10n    =  100 
 11n    =  110 
 12n    =  120 
 
Spatial dependence equation 
 r0 = pW r0 + b0 
 
The level-1 equation depicts how the dependent variable (differential success of 
white applicants versus minority applicants) is to be predicted by an intercept value (0n) 
and the year of application, the median white and minority incomes, the median white 
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and minority loan amounts, the white to minority income ratio, the white to minority loan 
ratio, the loan to income (LTI) ratio of whites and minorities, and the ratio of these last 
two LTIs, the change in neighborhood percent white since 2000, and the change in 
neighborhood SES since 2000. The impact of each of these predictors is accounted for in 
the parameter estimates of 1n  through 12n.  
As can be seen from the level-2 equations, the parameter estimates for 1n  
through 12n will be the same for each tract. The intercept (0n), however, will be 
estimated based on the neighborhood racial composition (NW) and neighborhood SES 
(NS). This means that the predicted value for the intercept will potentially change for 
each neighborhood in the sample. The spatial dependence equations shows how the level-
2 error on the intercept (r0) will be decomposed into two components, neighborhood level 
random error (b0) and spatial dependent aspect of the data.  In this equation, p is the 
spatial correlation, W is the spatial weight matrix, and r0 is a vector of random spatially 
autoregressive effects. 
 
Results 
 
Model 1: Unconditional Model 
This analysis aims to quantify the systematic impact of lending decisions on 
neighborhood racial composition. Model 1 provides immediate clarification of the 
connection between Δ%W and neighborhood level factors. Since the intraclass 
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correlation (ICC) shows that most of the variation of Δ%W (91% in the non-spatial 
model, 95% in the spatial model) takes place at level-1, this means that less than 10% of 
the variation in the dependent variable is associated with neighborhood level of the 
analysis.  There is, however, a strong spatial correlation in the outcome variable (0.86).   
The results of the unconditional model also show that the intercept is 0.96, 
suggesting that, in the typical tract, the successful applicants are 1% more white than the 
overall percentage of white of applicants. Subsequent models attempt to account for this 
pattern through inclusion of time and financial variables at level-1 and to account for the 
smaller proportion of variance at level-2 by including neighborhood racial composition 
and neighborhood socioeconomic variables.  
Model 2: Unconditional Growth Model 
Time, but not time-squared, was associated with the outcome variable. The 
coefficient was negative, suggesting that while whites were favored across all years, the 
magnitude of this reduced across time.  The model predicts that the Δ%W  is a positive 
1.14 in 2000 and this is reduced 0.79 in 2010. While time is a significant predictor, it 
only accounts for just over one-tenth of one percent of the total level-1 variance.  
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Table 4.2 Results of Models 1-3. 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
Coefficient 
p-
value 
 
    INTRCPT 0.960861 <0.001 0.966723 <0.001 0.951585 <0.001 
YEAR   -0.03513 0.037 -0.02279 0.302 
MEDWLOAN     -3.31847 0.095 
MMLOAN     3.06749 0.118 
RATIO     19.98707 0.035 
ILW     14.28622 0.006 
ILM     -13.4463 0.009 
ILR     -17.7865 0.004 
       Level-1 Variance Explained  -  0.1%  1.1% 
Level-2 Variance Explained  -  1.5%  13.1% 
Spatial Correlation  0.86  0.86   0.85 
 
Model 3: Socioeconomic Characteristics of Applicants 
The applicant economic characteristics were then added into the model.  The 
income variables were not significantly associated with the dependent variable, but loan 
amounts and the loan-to-income ratios were.  Perhaps surprisingly, this new model only 
accounted for marginally more of the level-1 variance: just over 1% of the total level 1 
variance. Interestingly, it accounted for 13% of the level-2 variation (suggesting that 
there are consistent differences between tracts on these variables). However, that is only 
13% of the 5% of the total variation associated with level-2 factors (i.e., 0.6% of total 
variance). The time variable also became insignificant in Model 3.  
Model 4: Neighborhood racial composition 
Both neighborhood racial composition variables (NW and NW2) were significant 
predictors of the dependent variable.  The NW was positive and NW2 was negative, 
resulting in a pattern of predicting where banks favored white applicants in all 
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neighborhoods, but this effect peaked in 40% white neighborhoods and then declined as 
neighborhoods became more white (see Figure 4.4 below). As shown in Table 4.3, 
adding these variables accounts for approximately 40% of the total variation at level-2 
and reduced the spatial correlation from 0.85 to 0.8.  
 
 
Figure 4.4 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and Δ%W 
 
Model 5: Neighborhood Socioeconomic Status 
There were strong associations between the three neighborhood socioeconomic 
variables and the dependent variable, but NS2 and NS3 ceased to be significant when the 
neighborhood SES-Percent White (NWNS) interaction variable was included.  The 
negative coefficient on NS suggests that as socioeconomic status increases, the 
differential in favor of whites decreases.  On the other hand, the positive coefficient of 
the interaction term suggests that there is a stronger differential in favor of whites in 
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whiter-wealthier neighborhoods. This model explained 58% the level-2 variance and 
reduced the spatial correlation coefficient to 0.77. Table 4.3 provides the results of Model 
5. 
 
Table 4.3 Results of Model 4, Model 5 and Final Model 
 Model 4 Model 5 Final Model 
  Coefficien
t 
 p-
value 
 Coefficien
t 
 p-
value 
 Coefficien
t 
 p-
value 
     INTRCPT 1.028 0.014 -1.40082 0.038 -1.63273 0.016 
     NW 
0.035352 0.01 0.086351 
<0.00
1 
0.090388 
<0.00
1 
     NS   
-1.23718 
<0.00
1 
-1.41788 
<0.00
1 
     NW2 
-0.00044 
<0.00
1 
-0.00071 
<0.00
1 
-0.00072 
<0.00
1 
     NWNS   
0.013056 
<0.00
1 
0.014655 
<0.00
1 
YEAR -0.02909 0.183 -0.03268 0.134 -0.03501 0.108 
MEDWLOAN -3.55269 0.071 -3.1987 0.109 -3.05502 0.125 
MMLOAN 3.805881 0.051 3.63181 0.062 3.627906 0.062 
RATIO 23.1022 0.014 22.15246 0.019 21.99532 0.019 
ILW 11.6417 0.026 12.352 0.018 12.43867 0.017 
ILM -11.8513 0.022 -12.531 0.015 -12.5976 0.014 
ILR -15.7259 0.011 -16.4802 0.007 -16.516 0.007 
CNSES3 
    
0.08071 0.016 
       Level-1 Variance 
Explained 
 
0.8% 
 
0.7% 
 
0.9% 
Level-2 Variance 
Explained 
 
40.4% 
 
58.0% 
 
59.5% 
Spatial Correlation 
 
0.80 
 
0.77 
 
0.77 
 
 
 
Models 6, 7 and 8: Neighborhood Changes and Racial Composition Dummy Variables 
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Out of the nine variables added in final three models, only one was significantly 
associated with Δ%W (change in neighborhood SES-cubed [CNSES3]). None of the 
three change in neighborhood racial composition (CPW) variables predicted changes in 
the dependent variable.  Changes in neighborhood SES at the more extreme ends seemed 
to be important since CNSES3 was significant, but the other two change in neighborhood 
SES variables (CNSES, CNSES2) were not. That is, large changes in the socioeconomic 
status of neighborhoods across the study period were positively associated with the 
differential favoring of white households.  Similarly, the neighborhood dummy variables 
for minority, mixed, and traditional white neighborhoods were not significantly 
associated with the dependent variable.   Adding the CNSES3 variable to the model did 
not have a substantial impact on the rest of the coefficients in the model and including 
this variable did not increase the amount of level-1 variation explained (see Table 4.3).  
Figure 4.5 describes the predicted association between neighborhood racial 
composition and Δ%W based on the parameter estimates of the final model (see Table 
4.3). The light grey line shows how Δ%W changes (the y-axis) when just looking at 
neighborhood racial composition (the x-axis) with all other predictors held at zero.  It 
shows a tendency for lending decisions to make neighborhoods with very few white 
households slightly less white than would be the case if a racially proportionate amount 
of applicants were successful.  For neighborhoods with populations of more than 20% 
white, the tendency is for these neighborhoods to be slightly whiter than would be 
predicted by the proportion of applicants who were white.  This trend peaks at 65% white 
and then attenuates as it approaches 100% white neighborhoods. When the neighborhood 
socioeconomic status and its interaction with neighborhood racial composition is 
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included (the dark grey line) at their means for each neighborhood racial composition 
grouping (0%-10% white, 10%-20% white, etc.), all neighborhoods are predicted to have 
a higher proportion of successful applicants who are white than the proportion of total 
applicants who are white.  This effect is non-linear and declines in neighborhoods that are 
greater than 80% white. The black line represents the predicted impact of lending 
decisions when all variables are included at their means for each neighborhood racial 
composition.  Since the level-1 predictors were not highly associated with the dependent 
variable we see very little difference between the black line and the dark grey line. On the 
whole the final model accounted for just under 1% of level-1 variation, 59% of level-2 
variation, and had a spatial correlation coefficient of 0.77. 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and Δ%W in the Final Model. 
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Table 4.4 shows the impact of lending decisions based on the average number of 
households applying for each tract based on its neighborhood racial composition. 
Assuming each variable at its average for each neighborhood composition (the same as 
the black line in Figure 4.5), the least white neighborhoods have an  increase of white 
households that is equivalent to about one-half of a household. The maximum increase in 
white households is a bit over one household and occurs in the neighborhoods that are 
between 60 and 90 percent white. Since the average tract has around 2,000 households, 
this is equivalent to a relatively minor increase of (1.25/2000 = 0.06%) in neighborhood 
percent white. If this pattern was maintained for 10 years, that would translate to lending 
decisions making a neighborhood just over half of one percent (0.63%) whiter than it 
would have been if applicants were approved in a racially proportionate way. As will be 
noted below, further research is needed to tease out this complex set of findings.  
Table 4.4 Impact of lending decisions on in-movers by neighborhood racial composition  
Tract 
% 
White 
Avg 
# 
Apps 
Avg # 
White 
Apps 
Avg # 
Approved 
Apps 
% of Apps 
who were 
White 
Predicted % of 
Successful Apps who 
were White 
Increase in # of 
White Hhlds in 
Tract 
0-10 45 11 30 24% 26% 0.4 
10-20 50 22 38 44% 46% 0.5 
20-30 83 37 66 45% 46% 0.5 
30-40 63 43 50 69% 70% 1.0 
40-50 67 47 52 70% 72% 1.1 
50-60 85 54 69 63% 65% 1.1 
60-70 117 80 97 69% 70% 1.3 
70-80 119 96 101 80% 82% 1.2 
80-90 183 157 160 86% 86% 1.3 
90-100 169 158 149 93% 94% 0.8 
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Discussion 
 
This study examined whether lenders systematically altered the racial 
composition of neighborhoods by the aggregate impact of their lending decisions. To do 
this it looked at the difference between the racial composition of successful loan 
applicants and the racial composition of the total pool of applicants for each tract in each 
year. Early analyses showed that on average, lending decisions made the successful 
applicants about one percent whiter than the original pool of applicants for a particular 
tract. The unconditional model also showed that most of the variation in the change in the 
racial composition of applicants was not associated with neighborhood level factors. That 
is, knowing which neighborhood a household was applying in only helped to predict a 
small amount of the variation in the dependent variable.  
Nevertheless, there were statistically significant relationships between 
neighborhood level characteristics and the dependent variable. As was shown in Table 
4.4, 60% to 90% white neighborhoods had the most substantial  increase in the number of 
white households who would be moving into a tract (approximately 1.25 households 
when all other variables were included at their means for that neighborhood racial 
composition).  
It is clear that lenders are not solely making their lending decisions based on 
neighborhood racial composition (in fact, well over 90% of their decision making is 
based on factors not related to neighborhood-level factors), it is also clear that there is a 
relationship between the neighborhood and spatial factors and the likelihood that white 
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applicants will be approved at a higher rate than non-white applicants. When the results 
are examined in terms of the differential approval of white households, 30% to 50% 
white neighborhoods are where there are the highest differentials in approval rates. 
However, as noted above, when data is examined in terms of increase in actual number of 
white households moving into a neighborhood, majority white neighborhoods (60%-90% 
white) are where we see the greatest impact of lending decisions (this is due to the larger 
number of applications in these neighborhoods). This impact does not seem to be 
mediated through the socioeconomic status of the neighborhood, and the relationship 
between neighborhood racial composition and differential success of  white applicants 
occurs after many economic controls are included about the composition of applicants. 
This pattern of results leaves open the question of whether  lenders are participating in 
geographic contingent lending – favoring white applicants in whiter neighborhoods – a 
topic to be explored in Chapter 5. 
The pattern of results also shows that a closer analysis of which neighborhoods 
are seeing the strongest impact on Δ%W may be highly productive. The combination of 
statistically significant association of neighborhood percentage white, high spatial 
dependence, and a low proportion of variance associated with level-2, suggests that 
perhaps some isolated neighborhoods in certain parts of the metropolitan area are seeing 
a distinct pattern of lending decisions, while other neighborhoods do not have a 
systematic pattern in Δ%W. A highly specific pattern will not necessarily be revealed by 
a multiyear study of multiple neighborhoods such as this one, and a mixed method 
exploration of both statistical patterns and institutional approaches to certain parts of the 
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metropolitan area would be better suited to enhancing understanding of these potentially 
highly localized patterns.  
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CHAPTER V 
 
DO LENDING INSTITUTIONS DISCRIMINATE ON THE BASIS OF APPLICANT 
RACE, NEIGHBORHOOD RACIAL COMPOSITION, OR, THE INTERACTION 
BETWEEN THEM? 
 
While analysis 2 simply investigated whether there may be factors other than 
preferences (i.e,, lending decisions) playing a role in segregation, question 3 asks whether 
there is evidence of discrimination in lending decisions and whether this, specifically, is 
contributing to racial residential segregation. To this end, this question explores three 
types of discrimination: discrimination based on race of applicant, discrimination based 
on racial composition of neighborhood (redlining), and discrimination based on the 
interaction of applicant and neighborhood racial characteristics. The third form of 
discrimination, defined by Holloway (1998) as “geographically contingent lending”, 
could provide a direct pathway from discriminatory lending decisions to segregation. In 
this chapter, I expand on this idea and look at the findings from the most important 
studies in the area, present the hypotheses, and then introduce the models that will be 
used to test the proposed hypotheses.  
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Research on Racial Discrimination in Lending 
 
Historically, mortgage discrimination researchers focused on either discrimination 
against minority neighborhoods (redlining) or discrimination against minority individuals 
(Holloway, 1998). In many ways, the difference between the two types of discrimination 
was minor – in America’s strongly segregated cities, minority applicants generally 
applied for loans in minority neighborhoods. Increasingly, however, minority households 
are searching for housing outside of traditional minority neighborhoods.  
The most comprehensive and controversial lending discrimination study is known 
as the Boston Fed Study (Munnell, Geoffrey, Lynn, & James, 1996). The study focused 
on discrimination based on the race of applicant. The original findings, using data from 
1990, found large differences in the denial rates between whites and blacks, even after 
controlling for nearly every important criterion used in loan under-writing. The study 
found that minority applicants were eight percent more likely to be denied a loan in 
comparison to similarly qualified whites (Munnell, et al., 1996). Nevertheless, the study 
came under strong criticism, both methodologically and conceptually. A decade of 
reanalysis of the same dataset, however, has come to the conclusion that there is strong 
evidence that lenders in Boston engaged in racial discrimination in lending (Ross & 
Yinger, 2002). The Boston Fed Study has not been replicated because, to date, no lenders 
have provided the refined level of data that was utilized in that study. In a study also 
using the Boston Fed data, Tootell (1996) looked into redlining in the Boston area and 
found no relationship between neighborhood racial composition and denial probability.  
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Two studies by Steven Holloway have looked more closely at the interaction 
between race of applicants and the racial composition of the neighborhood they were 
applying to live in. In his study of Columbus, Ohio – based on 1992 HMDA data – 
Holloway (1998)  uses multilevel modeling to analyze mortgage lending decisions by 
census tract. After controlling for socioeconomic factors, he tests whether there is 
evidence of discrimination against minority applicants. He finds that, on average, there is 
no evidence of discrimination. However, the variance of the census tract-level error term 
on race is significantly greater than zero, suggesting that the importance of race changes 
across census tracts. Holloway then tests for the importance of redlining by examining 
whether tract racial composition is predictive of loan denial. His results, like those of 
others (Abariotes et al., 1993; Tootell, 1996), suggest that redlining was not an issue. 
However, when he tests for an interaction between neighborhood racial composition and 
race of applicant he finds that there is a strong effect, and that minority applicants moving 
into white neighborhoods, particularly those with large loans, are denied at rates 
significantly greater than chance. Similarly, white applicants in minority neighborhoods, 
particularly those applying for smaller loans, were more likely to be denied than minority 
applicants. 
Holloway’s Columbus study was replicated by Holloway and Wyly (2001) using 
1996 HMDA data from Atlanta. In this study, unlike Holloway (1998), the authors found 
that black applicants were more likely to be denied in all tracts. However, like the earlier 
study, they found no evidence of redlining and strong evidence of geographically 
contingent lending – that is, lending decisions were not affected by the racial composition 
of the neighborhood, but there was a significant interaction between the race of applicant 
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and neighborhood racial composition. Specifically, they found that in Atlanta black 
households applying for loans in white affluent neighborhoods were much more likely to 
be denied. These results echo those found in Chapter 4: lending decisions seem to favor 
whites most in white neighborhoods. 
Analysis 3 builds on the lending discrimination research of Holloway (1998) and 
Holloway and Wyly (2001). It tests three hypotheses: 
H1 - Individual Discrimination: Lenders are more likely to approve the 
loans for white applicants than non-white applicants, even after 
controlling for key socioeconomic factors.  
H2 - Redlining: Lenders are more likely to deny loans that are for 
houses in minority neighborhoods, even after controlling for 
socioeconomic factors. 
H3 - Geographically Contingent Lending: Lenders are more likely to 
deny loans to minority applicants attempting to move to white 
neighborhoods, even after controlling for socioeconomic factors. 
 I will use a spatial 2-level logistic model to predict likelihood of denial based on 
individual characteristics (e.g., race, gender, income, probability of credit score denial), 
loan and lender characteristics (loan amount, loan to income ratio, type of lending 
institution), and neighborhood characteristics (socioeconomic status [income, education, 
housing value], vacancy rate, population change,  neighborhood racial composition). This 
will allow for the testing of the three hypothetical forms of discrimination: traditional 
(minority applicants are denied loans), redlining (minority neighborhoods are denied 
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loans), and geographically contingent (denial probability is dependent on an interaction 
between race of applicant and neighborhood racial composition). To test for 
geographically contingent lending denials, a cross level interaction where the influence of 
applicant race is predicted by neighborhood level variables will be modeled (more detail 
on these equations is provided below). 
 In combination, this third set of analyses will help answer the question about 
whether mortgage lenders appear to be discriminating on the basis of applicant race, 
neighborhood composition, and/or the interaction between the two. 
 
Data 
 
From the Nashville MSA HMDA Loan Application Register I took the individual 
loan records for valid census tracts in the seven county study area where the following 
were true [cases remaining]: 
1. It was a home purchase loan [593,387] 
1. The borrower was going to reside in the home [539,884]  
2. Loan was either approved or denied [367,107] 
2. Applicant race was reported [320,718] 
3. Case was not flagged as edited (indicative of an incomplete record) [268,053] 
4. Inflation adjusted income and loan amounts were between $20,000 and $500,000 
[255,184] 
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Using this data set, I created the following variables: 
 APP: Dummy variable indicating whether the loan was approved or denied (the 
dependent variable)  
 Agency dummies representing each different type of lending institution (i.e., 
those regulated by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), Federal 
Reserve System (FRS), Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS), National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), or 
other)  
 LCON: Conventional loan dummy (as opposed to an Federal Housing Agency 
[FHA], Veterans Administreation [VA], or Rural Development [RD] backed loan) 
 LINC & LLOAN: Natural log of inflation adjusted income and loan amounts 
 LTI: Loan to income ratio variable 
 PNHW & CNHW: Non-Hispanic white applicant and co-applicant dummies 
 PF: Female primary applicant, no co-applicant dummy 
 Denied for credit history dummy (if any of the three denial reasons involved 
credit history), to help create the instrumental variable quantifying the probability 
that an applicant would be denied due to their credit history (FV). 
Most of the census tract variables used in Holloway and Wyly
16
 were strongly 
correlated with the NSES variable I had created for the earlier analyses.  The two 
exceptions were population change and vacancy rate. In order to simplify comparisons 
                                                          
16
 Percent white, Percent with bachelor degrees, Median income, Median value, Change in Population, Rent 
to value, Vacancy rate, Percent of Population that did not move in last 5 years. 
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across models, I opted to use the NSES index variable in conjunction with the population 
change and vacancy rate variables in my models.  
After univariate analysis of each variable was carried out, I dropped observations that 
had outlying cases. This included less than 5% of the total cases in the 2000-2004 data 
(5,903 cases) and less than 2.5% of the 2005-2009 cases (2624 cases removed)
17
.  
 
Analyses 
 
Due to the large sample size and complexity of the analysis, I split the sample into 
three loan cohorts.  The first group included loan applications between 2000 and 2002, 
when all applications were included located within 1990 census tracts.  The second group 
included applications between 2003 and 2004, when there was inconsistent usage of 1990 
and 2000 census geographies by HMDA reporting institutions.  The third cohort included 
applications between 2005 and 2009 (all using Census 2000 tracts). Neighborhood-level 
predictors were based on Census 2000 data for the first two cohorts, while 2005-2009 
ACS data was used as the neighborhood predictors for the third data set (the variables 
were the same, however).    
For each of the three groups, I followed Holloway and Wyly’s (2001) method of 
creating an instrumental variable predicting the likelihood of an applicant having bad 
credit. This variable attempts to provide a control variable for credit history, since this is 
                                                          
17
 The larger proportion of the earlier cohorts that were outliers was probably due to the process of merging 
2000 census characteristics into 1990 tracts that was described in Chapter 3 (this was unnecessary in the 
later sample as the 2005-2009 cases were all listed in 2000 census tracts). 
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not included in HMDA data (however, denial reasons are an optional field in HMDA 
reports). The variable was created by running a logistic regression predicting the 
likelihood of denial due to poor credit history on half the applications of each loan cohort 
and then using the coefficients on each variable to predict the probability of poor credit 
history on the second half of the group (the data that was used in the subsequent models). 
Correlations between the fitted value and outcome were consistent between each half of 
each loan cohort, suggesting that the model was effective at identifying credit history 
denials in the second data sets. Histograms and descriptive statistics were also compared 
for each group and found to be consistent across cohorts and across each half of the data. 
The descriptive statistics for each variable used in the spatially dependent logistic 
multilevel models can be found below in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 2000-2002 2003-2004 2005-2009 
 
N MEAN SD MIN MAX N MEAN SD MIN MAX N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Dependent Variable (Loan Approved dummy variable) 
APP 34371 0.85 0.36 0 1 
 
25587 0.87 0.34 0 1 
 
57629 0.88 0.32 0 1 
Type of Lending Institution (Regulating Agency dummies) 
OCC 34371 0.27 0.44 0 1 
 
25587 0.27 0.44 0 1 
 
57629 0.2 0.4 0 1 
FRS 34371 0.17 0.38 0 1 
 
25587 0.27 0.44 0 1 
 
57629 0.26 0.44 0 1 
FDIC 34371 0.05 0.21 0 1 
 
25587 0.05 0.22 0 1 
 
57629 0.12 0.32 0 1 
OTS 34371 0.07 0.25 0 1 
 
25587 0.03 0.16 0 1 
 
57629 0.03 0.18 0 1 
NCUA 34371 0 0.07 0 1 
 
25587 0.01 0.07 0 1 
 
57629 0.01 0.1 0 1 
Loan Type (Conventional Loan Dummy) 
LCON 34371 0.67 0.47 0 1 
 
25587 0.74 0.44 0 1 
 
57629 0.77 0.42 0 1 
Income and Loan Amounts (Natural Log of Income and Loan Amounts, and Loan to Income Ratio) 
LINC 34371 4.14 0.53 3.01 6.21 
 
25587 4.12 0.54 3.02 6.21 
 
57629 4.15 0.55 3 6.21 
LLOAN 34371 4.79 0.6 3.01 6.21 
 
25587 4.86 0.6 3.02 6.21 
 
57629 4.86 0.66 3 6.21 
LTI 34371 1.17 0.15 0.55 1.89 
 
25587 1.19 0.15 0.5 1.75 
 
57629 1.18 0.17 0.53 1.85 
Applicant Race and Gender (Applicant White, Co-applicant White, Primary Applicant Female with  no Co-applicant) 
PNHW 34371 0.84 0.36 0 1 
 
25587 0.82 0.38 0 1 
 
57629 0.81 0.39 0 1 
CNHW 34371 0.43 0.5 0 1 
 
25587 0.38 0.49 0 1 
 
57629 0.35 0.48 0 1 
PF 34371 0.22 0.42 0 1 
 
25587 0.25 0.43 0 1 
 
57629 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Year Variables18 
Y1 34371 0.32 0.47 0 1 
 
25587 0.46 0.5 0 1 
 
57629 -0.43 1.3 -2 2 
Y2 34371 0.32 0.46 0 1 
       
57629 1.87 1.66 0 4 
Y3 
            
57629 -1.2 4.73 -8 8 
Credit History Instrument (Predicted Likelihood of Denial Due to Poor Credit History) 
FV 34371 0.05 0.05 0 0.3 
 
25587 0.04 0.03 0 0.3 
 
57629 0.03 0.02 0 0.3 
                  
                                                          
18
 These are dummy variables in the first two loan cohorts (2000-2002,2003-2004), and linear, squared and cubed terms in 2005-2009 data. 
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 2000-2002 2003-2004 2005-2009 
 
N MEAN SD MIN MAX N MEAN SD MIN MAX N MEAN SD MIN MAX 
Level 2 Variables (Tract % White, Tract SES, (Tract % White)2, (Tract SES)2, Vacancy Rate, Population Change, Race x SES Interaction) 
NW 166 76.04 24.94 0.71 97.73 
 
227 75.92 24.41 0.71 98.49 
 
215 70.64 25.25 0 98.78 
NS 166 -0.1 1.43 -2.76 4.95 
 
227 0.1 1.61 -2.76 5.37 
 
215 -0.02 1.6 -2.39 5.59 
NW2 166 6400.92 2835.04 0.51 9550.19 
 
227 6357.13 2827 0.51 9701.11 
 
215 5624.54 2930.66 0 9758.2 
NS2 166 0.31 4.18 -7.6 24.54 
 
227 1.12 5.44 -7.6 28.82 
 
215 2.54 4.67 0 31.25 
VAC 166 5.9 2.37 1.94 14.83 
 
227 5.63 2.33 1.09 14.83 
 
215 0.08 0.05 0 0.28 
POPC 166 1.14 0.21 0.63 2.11 
 
227 1.15 0.21 0.63 2.35 
 
215 1.15 0.22 0.63 2.35 
NWNS 166 13.01 112.87 -167.68 457.85 
 
227 29.13 133.29 -167.68 520.36 
 
215 22.35 125.41 -175.29 539.56 
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Maps 5.1 and 5.2 show the spatial distribution of each of the variables used in the 
analyses.  The maps show each variable broken out into quintiles (5 equally sized 
groups), with tracts scoring in the lowest quintile of each variable colored white and the 
shading of tracts getting progressively darker as the values increase (the green census 
tracts demark areas of no data).  The first map shows the average approval rates for each 
census tract, with the highest approval rates found in the south-western edge of Davidson 
County and the neighboring portion of Williamson County. The second map shows the 
proportion of applicants who are white in each census tract. Not surprisingly, the ring 
counties have the highest proportion of white applicants.  Of the lending institution maps, 
we see that Federal Reserve (FRS) and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) 
regulated lenders are highly active in the wealthier areas of the metropolitan area (e.g., 
Williamson County). Similarly, these wealthier areas are more likely to utilize 
conventional loan products. Lenders who were not overseen by a major regulator were 
most active in the north Nashville and Antioch areas – two areas that have much higher 
concentrations of minorities. Davidson County census tracts have much higher numbers 
of primary applicants who are female with no coapplicants. The northwestern quadrant of 
the metropolitan area has higher rates of denial due to credit history (including North 
Nashville, but also incorporating Sumner County).  
Overall, the maps show clear neighborhood, county and regional dynamics. 
Southern Davidson County and Williamson County often have similar values on the 
different variables mapped. Similarly, central and southeastern Davidson County tend to 
have their own distinct patterns as does the northern horseshoe of counties: Cheatham, 
Robertson, Sumner, and Wilson counties. Rutherford County, to the southeast of the 
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metropolitan area, tends to have a set of patterns that fluctuate between those of central 
and southeastern Davidson County, and the northern horseshoe of counties. 
Maps 5.1 Level-1 Variables 
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Maps 5.1 Level-1 Variables (continued) 
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Maps 5.1 Level-1 Variables (continued) 
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Maps 5.2 Level-2 Variables 
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In order to ensure comparability between the three loan cohorts, I began with the 
same, relatively comprehensive, predictive model testing H1 and H2 (individual 
discrimination and redlining, respectively). I refer to this model as the comparison model 
(or M1). This model is described in the equations below. After this model was estimated 
for each loan cohort, I then explored whether a better model could be estimated by 
including an interaction term between neighborhood racial composition and 
neighborhood SES, neighborhood vacancy rates, and neighborhood population change. I 
refer to this second model as the expanded model (or M2). Following that, I examined 
whether there was evidence of geographic contingent lending (H3) for each subsample. 
This third model is referred to as the geographic contingent model (or M3). 
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Level-1 Equation for the Comparison Model: 
Log (Probability [APP=1] / (1- Probability [APP=1] ) )  
= 0n + 1n LCON + 2n LINC + 3n LLOAN +  4n PNHW + 5n CNHW +  
6n LTI + 7n FV  +  1i(INSTITUTIONTYPEi) + 2i(YEARi)  + epn 
 
 0n   =  00  +01NW  + 02NW2 + 03NS + 04NS2 +  r0 
1n   =  10 
 2n   =  20 
 3n   =  30 
 4n   =  40 
5n   =  50 
 6n   =  60 
 7n   =  70 
 8n   =  80 
 9n   =  90 
10n   =  100 
 11n   =  110 
 12n   =  120 
13n   =  130 
 14n   =  140 
 15n   =  150 
 
Spatial dependence equation 
 r0 = pW r0 + b0 
 
The level-1 equation shows how the logit of approval is predicted by the intercept 
(0n) and the loan type, the income and loan amounts, the race of applicant and 
coapplicant, the loan to income ratio, the likelihood of denial due to credit history, the 
type of lending institution and the year of application.  As with the other independent 
variables in earlier models, the parameters are estimated to have a consistent impact in all 
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tracts.  The value of the intercept, however, is dependent on the neighborhood racial 
composition and neighborhood SES (as well as their squared terms).  
 
Results 
 
Comparison Model (M1) 
The results of this model are displayed in Table 5.2 below.  The results for each 
analyses showed a strong positive impact associated with non-Hispanic white primary 
applicants (PNHW). This demonstrates that, controlling for the neighborhood, loan and 
other applicant characteristics in the model, white applicants were favored over non-
white applicants (H1 is strongly supported). Figure 5.1 shows these relationships, with 
the dotted lines (white applicants) always being higher than the solid lines (minority 
applicants). The results also showed a non-linear relationship between neighborhood 
percentage white and applicant approval, although the 2000-2002 data coefficient is 
slightly below the significance threshold on the non-squared term. As can be seen in 
Figure 5.1, the impact of neighborhood percent white peaks around 50% white. Thus, 
there is inconsistent evidence for redlining (H2) when looking at the results of all three 
models. On the whole, these results show that lending institutions are more likely to 
approve white applicants and are more likely to approve applicants who want to live in 
racially mixed neighborhoods, even after controlling for neighborhood SES.  
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Table 5.2 Results of Comparison Model (M1) for each Loan Cohort 
 2000-2002  2003-2004  2005-2009 
         Fixed Effect  Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value   
INTRCPT2 1.447532 <0.001  1.413116 <0.001  1.216718 <0.001 
     PW 0.011219 0.099  0.012577 0.037  0.020898 <0.001 
     NS 0.366743 <0.001  0.210544 <0.001  0.201083 <0.001 
     PW2 -0.00013 0.022  -0.00013 0.01  -0.00019 <0.001 
     NS2 -0.0602 <0.001  -0.03192 0.025  -0.01767 0.036 
OCC 0.715973 <0.001  0.391326 <0.001  0.156496 <0.001 
FRS 0.743489 <0.001  0.770828 <0.001  0.348338 <0.001 
FDIC 0.90124 <0.001  0.945146 <0.001  0.937626 <0.001 
OTS 0.922876 <0.001  0.205978 0.09  0.200797 0.009 
NCUA 0.553337 0.018  0.543571 0.046  0.112897 0.468 
LCON -0.56269 <0.001  -0.31989 <0.001  -0.29271 <0.001 
LINC -0.31064 0.244  -0.56627 0.032  -1.05385 <0.001 
LLOAN 1.014926 <0.001  1.028786 <0.001  1.268269 <0.001 
PNHW 0.40339 <0.001  0.354351 <0.001  0.472422 <0.001 
CNHW 0.063009 0.127  0.078171 0.121  0.231822 <0.001 
PF 0.164668 <0.001  0.029682 0.546  0.082304 0.013 
LTI -3.16075 <0.001  -3.45914 <0.001  -4.95255 <0.001 
Y 0.18014 <0.001  0.080051 0.055  -0.11611 <0.001 
Y2 0.082271 0.04  - -  0.007903 0.394 
Y3 - -  - -  0.032321 <0.001 
FV -4.29403 <0.001  -5.8573 <0.001  -3.11591 0.007 
 
 
Table 5.3 shows the estimated intraclass correlation (ICC) assuming that level-1 
variance is π2/3 (Raudenbush & Bryk, 2004). It also shows the percentage of the level-2 
variance explained by the models, the spatial correlation in the error terms and the change 
in spatial correlation from the unconditional model.  The estimated ICC shows, for all 
three cohorts, the majority of variation in loan approval decisions is due to applicant level 
factors rather than neighborhood level factors. This should be expected, as lenders are 
likely to be more concerned with the credit worthiness of applicants than with the 
neighborhood that they plan on moving in to. In the 2000-2004 loan cohorts, the models 
helped explain two-thirds to three quarters of the level-2 variation, and also reduced the 
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spatial dependence of the error terms.  A smaller amount of level-2 variation was 
explained in 2005-2009 model, but the spatial dependence in the model was reduced from 
correlation coefficient of almost 0.9 to 0.32. This reduction in spatial correlation suggests 
that what the unconditional model was calculating as spatial dependence was in fact 
accounted for by spatially correlated values in tract percentage white and SES. 
Table 5.3 Model Fit for Comparison Models (M1)  
 2000-
2002 
 2003-
2004 
 2005-
2009 
Estimated Intraclass Correlation  
(% of Variance associated with Level-2) 6.2%  3.5%  2.9% 
Percentage of Level 2 Variance Explained  75.7%   67.5%    42.4% 
Spatial Correlation  in Dependent Variable    0.679     0.524     0.323 
Change in Spatial Correlation from Unconditional 
Model 
-0.134  -0.357  -0.549 
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Figure 5.1 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and probability of 
approval for white and minority applicants for each loan cohort (M1) 
 
2000-2002 Loan Cohort – M2 – Expanded Model 
Model 1 did not include three variables previous research suggested potentially 
impact the likelihood of denial: vacancy rates, population change and an interaction term 
between neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood SES. When these 
neighborhood level variables were added to the comparison model (M1), it was found 
that vacancy rates and population change variables were not significant predictors of 
denial rates, but the interaction between neighborhood racial composition and 
socioeconomic status was positively associated with denial rates.  The positive coefficient 
on the interaction term suggests that there was a compounding effect of higher 
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
A
p
p
ro
va
l P
ro
b
ab
ili
ty
 
Neighborhood % White 
Minority Applicants - 2000-02
Minority Applicants - 2003-04
Minority Applicants - 2005-09
White Applicants - 2000-02
White Applicants - 2003-04
White Applicants - 2005-09
 107 
 
socioeconomic status and neighborhood percent white: applications were increasingly 
likely to be approved in whiter-wealthier neighborhoods than would be predicted by just 
examining the coefficients on each of these variables independently. The full results of 
this model can be seen in Table 5.4. 
The comparison of the M1 and M2 curves in Figure 5.2 depicts how applicants in 
high minority neighborhoods were disadvantaged compared to all other applicants. In 
fact, a minority applicant in zero percent white neighborhood has 0.08 lower probability 
of becoming approved compared to a minority applicant in a 100% white neighborhood 
(40%-80% white neighborhoods were the most favored). 
2000-2002 Loan Cohort – M3 – Geographic Contingent Lending    
M3 built on the results of M2 to assess whether there was evidence of 
neighborhood contingent lending in the 2000-2002 data (H3).  The neighborhood 
contingent lending models have a similar specification to the ones above, but the 
applicant race parameter (4n) is predicted by neighborhood level variables: For example,  
4n   =  40 + 41NW  + 42NS  
 
That is, the parameter estimate for applicant race is predicted by a level-2 
intercept (40; the average impact of being white after neighborhood racial composition 
and SES has been taken into account), neighborhood racial composition and 
neighborhood SES. If 41 and  42 were non-significant, it would show that there was no 
evidence of geographic contingent lending. 
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The 2000-2002 loan cohort had strong evidence of neighborhood-level variables 
interacting with the race of applicant (see Table 5.4). As the light gray lines in Figure 5.2 
show, white applicants were less likely to be approved in high minority neighborhoods 
(10% white or less), but more likely to be approved in all others.  As can be seen by the 
shape and position of the two grey dotted lines, M2 and M3 had very similar predictions 
for white applicants. In contrast, the expected likelihood of approval for minority 
applicants was quite different between M2 and M3.  As mentioned above, in M2, the 
likelihood of approval for minority applicants was strongly associated with neighborhood 
racial composition. In M3, there was no statistical association between minority approval 
rates and neighborhood racial composition after the cross level interaction was included 
in the model (hence the straight light grey solid line in Figure 5.2).  
The geographic contingent lending model (M3) showed that racial and 
socioeconomic aspects of neighborhoods were significant predictors of the impact of race 
of applicant. (In fact, the direct effect of the race of applicant was insignificant after 
neighborhood level variables were included.)  As a neighborhood increases its 
socioeconomic status (50% to 80% white was the peak likelihood of approval), a white 
applicant is more likely to be approved. Including these variables increases overall model 
fit, but reduces the significance of the neighborhood racial composition variables impact 
on the level-1 intercept (0n). Thus, we can conclude that in this dataset, the importance of 
neighborhood racial composition was associated with the impact of the race of the 
applicant rather than for all applicants in general.  
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Table 5.4 Results of M2 and M3 for 2000-2002 Cohort 
 Model 2  Model 3 
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  p-value 
  
 Coefficient  p-value 
  
 
    
INTRCPT 0.860473 0.024 
 
1.45725 <0.001 
     PW 0.023596 0.013 
 
- - 
     NS 0.069441 0.678 
 
0.189306 0.001 
     NW2 -0.0002 0.003 
 
- - 
     NS2 -0.06733 <0.001 
 
-0.05715 <0.001 
     NWNS 0.003641 0.06 
 
- - 
OCC 0.714479 <0.001 
 
0.709661 <0.001 
FRS 0.740166 <0.001 
 
0.733228 <0.001 
FDIC 0.900777 <0.001 
 
0.89962 <0.001 
OTS 0.924813 <0.001 
 
0.925442 <0.001 
NCUA 0.571793 0.015 
 
0.605235 0.01 
LCON -0.56034 <0.001 
 
-0.55059 <0.001 
LINC -0.3486 0.191 
 
-0.42123 0.113 
LLOAN 1.035841 <0.001 
 
1.079124 <0.001 
PNHW 0.398845 <0.001 
 
-0.23037 0.371 
     PW - - 
 
0.027314 <0.001 
     NS - - 
 
0.192367 <0.001 
     NW2 - - 
 
-0.00023 <0.001 
CNHW 0.062378 0.131 
 
0.057867 0.162 
PF 0.162003 <0.001 
 
0.152869 <0.001 
LTI -3.2788 <0.001 
 
-3.52013 <0.001 
Y1 0.179803 <0.001 
 
0.180417 <0.001 
Y2 0.081363 0.042 
 
0.081915 0.041 
FV -4.4614 <0.001 
 
-4.73371 <0.001 
 
Table 5.5 shows the percentage of level-2 variance explained for each of the three 
models tested: the comparison model (M1), the expanded model (M2), and the 
geographically contingent model (M3). It shows that each subsequent model accounted 
for slightly more of the level-2 variance and each slightly reduced the spatial correlation 
in the level-2 error terms. 
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Table 5.5 2000-2002 Model fit statistics 
2000-2002 Loan Cohort 
Model 
M1  M2  M3 
Percentage of Level-2 Variance Explained  75.7%  76.0%  76.5% 
Spatial Correlation      0.679  0.657  0.643 
Change in Spatial Correlation from Unconditional Model -0.134  -0.157  -0.170 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and probability of 
approval for white and minority applicants for each of the 2000-2002 models 
 
2003-2004 Loan Cohort – M2 – Expanded Model 
Further exploration of the second loan cohort showed that vacancy rates and 
population change were significant predictors of loan approval.  Including these variables 
slightly reduced the coefficient on neighborhood racial composition and its significance 
0.7
0.72
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.8
0.82
0.84
0.86
0.88
0.9
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
A
p
p
ro
va
l P
ro
b
ab
ilt
y 
Neighborhood % White 
Minority Applicants - M1
Minority Applicants - M2
Minority Applicants - M3
White Applicants - M1
White Applicants - M2
White Applicants - M3
 111 
 
level. Thus, there was weaker evidence for redlining with this specification. There was 
also no evidence of an interaction between neighborhood SES and neighborhood racial 
composition. However, at level-1, applicant race was still an important predictor of loan 
approval.  The best model can be found in the table below. Looking at Figure 5.3, we see 
a simple downward shift from the black lines (M1) to the dark grey lines (M2), but no 
discernible change in impact of neighborhood percent white.  
2003-2004 Loan Cohort – M3 – Geographic Contingent Lending 
In M3, as with the earlier 2000-2002 cohort, both neighborhood racial 
composition and socioeconomic status were significant predictors of the importance of 
the race of applicant and when these interaction effects were included, the direct impact 
of applicant race was insignificant.  White applicants were more likely to be approved in 
whiter and wealthier neighborhoods although this effect was non-linear (the negative 
coefficients on the squared terms showing that this was ameliorated slightly when in the 
most white and wealthy neighborhoods). This final model did not increase the amount of 
level-2 variance explained in the model, but substantially reduced the spatial correlation 
of the level-2 error terms (see Table 5.7). Figure 5.3 shows, unlike in the 2000-2002 data, 
that the predicted likelihood of approval for white applicants in M3 had quite a different 
trajectory from M2. There was a sharp drop in approval probability for white households 
applying in high minority neighborhoods (10% white or less), with approval peaking 
between 40% and 80% white before dropping down again to almost being equal with 
minority applicants in 100% white neighborhoods. Once again, minority applicants 
weren’t favored in comparison to whites in any neighborhoods but for those that were 
almost 0% white. 
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Table 5.6 Results of M2 and M3 for 2003-2004 Cohort 
 Model 2  Model 3 
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value 
 
 
 
  
    INTRCPT 1.295356 <0.001 
 
1.428466 <0.001 
     PW 0.011509 0.055 
 
- - 
     VAC -0.0312 0.026 
 
-0.03593 0.009 
     POPC 0.292092 0.024 
 
0.276824 0.024 
     NS 0.164917 0.002 
 
-0.07105 0.075 
     NW2 -0.00013 0.011 
 
- - 
     NS2 -0.02497 0.085 
 
- - 
OCC 0.394436 <0.001 
 
0.389804 <0.001 
FRS 0.777583 <0.001 
 
0.759082 <0.001 
FDIC 0.950897 <0.001 
 
0.930894 <0.001 
OTS 0.20635 0.089 
 
0.203773 0.094 
NCUA 0.517107 0.058 
 
0.601448 0.028 
LCON -0.31679 <0.001 
 
-0.31376 <0.001 
LINC -0.52513 0.047 
 
-0.62309 0.018 
LLOAN 1.012066 <0.001 
 
1.051772 <0.001 
PNHW 0.365729 <0.001 
 
-0.4016 0.19 
     PW - - 
 
0.034402 <0.001 
     NS - - 
 
0.329383 <0.001 
     NW2 - - 
 
-0.0003 <0.001 
     NS2 - - 
 
-0.04011 0.008 
CNHW 0.073448 0.145 
 
0.069924 0.166 
PF 0.031961 0.516 
 
0.01396 0.776 
LTI -3.35593 <0.001 
 
-3.6208 <0.001 
FV -5.55731 <0.001 
 
-6.44689 <0.001 
Y1 0.084383 0.043 
 
0.077874 0.062 
 
 
Table 5.7 2003-2004 Model fit statistics 
2003-2004 Loan Cohort 
Model 
M1  M2  M3 
Percentage of Level 2 Variance Explained   67.5%  67.8%  67.1% 
Spatial Correlation      0.524  0.489  0.256 
Change in Spatial Correlation from Unconditional Model -0.357  -0.392  -0.625 
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Figure 5.3 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and probability of 
approval for white and minority applicants for each of the 2003-2004 models 
 
2005-2009 Loan Cohort – M2 – Expanded Model 
Further analysis showed that there was a significant interaction between 
neighborhood racial composition and neighborhood socioeconomic status. Population 
change was just short of traditional significance thresholds and vacancy rates did not 
appear to have any relationship with the dependent variable. This fuller model continued 
to show evidence of neighborhood redlining and discrimination on the basis of the race of 
applicant (H1 and H2). As can be seen in Table 5.9, this model accounted for 5% more of 
the level-2 variance, but it increased the spatial dependence of the model. Figure 5.4 
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shows how the importance of neighborhood racial composition increases after the 
interaction term and population change variable were included. The approval probability 
for minority applicants in M2 increases from below 0.6 in a 0% white neighborhood to 
over 0.75 in a 100% white neighborhood (it peaks at 60-70% white). 
2005-2009 Loan Cohort – M3 – Geographic Contingent Model 
In M3 for the 2005-2009 loan cohort, unlike the earlier two analyses, 
neighborhood racial composition did not moderate the impact of race of applicant on 
approval probability.  Thus in Figure 5.4 the light and dark grey lines run right over one 
another. However, neighborhood socioeconomic status was positively associated with 
approval probability. In this analysis, white applicants fared better in all neighborhoods. 
Also, in contrast to the earlier cohorts, there was evidence of redlining in the 2005-2009 
data with the racial composition variables continuing to predict the level-1 intercept 
coefficient. Compared to M2, this model accounted for slightly less of the level-2 
variation, but reduced the spatial dependence to a larger extent. 
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Table 5.8 Results of M2 and M3 for 2005-2009 Cohort 
 Model 2  Model 3 
Fixed Effect  Coefficient  p-value   Coefficient  p-value 
 
 
 
  
INTRCPT 0.383066 0.205 
 
0.37675 0.211 
     PW 0.034458 <0.001 
 
0.034982 <0.001 
     POPC 0.212158 0.061 
 
0.203796 0.072 
     NS -0.17368 0.194 
 
-0.20404 0.128 
     PW2 -0.00027 <0.001 
 
-0.00027 <0.001 
     NS2 -0.03601 0.002 
 
-0.03443 0.003 
     NWNS 0.004759 0.007 
 
0.004132 0.019 
OCC 0.156741 <0.001 
 
0.156986 <0.001 
FRS 0.347993 <0.001 
 
0.341001 <0.001 
FDIC 0.937528 <0.001 
 
0.92965 <0.001 
OTS 0.199585 0.009 
 
0.203269 0.008 
NCUA 0.10779 0.489 
 
0.15346 0.327 
LCON -0.29368 <0.001 
 
-0.28992 <0.001 
LINC -1.0501 <0.001 
 
-1.08208 <0.001 
LLOAN 1.265015 <0.001 
 
1.27646 <0.001 
PNHW 0.471303 <0.001 
 
0.476093 <0.001 
     NS - - 
 
0.098123 <0.001 
CNHW 0.230444 <0.001 
 
0.224266 <0.001 
PF 0.083876 0.011 
 
0.078111 0.019 
LTI -4.93914 <0.001 
 
-5.02855 <0.001 
Y1 -0.11621 <0.001 
 
-0.11526 <0.001 
Y2 0.007564 0.415 
 
0.008464 0.362 
Y3 0.032358 <0.001 
 
0.032438 <0.001 
FV -3.08265 0.008 
 
-3.63526 0.002 
 
 
Table 5.9 2005-2009 Model fit statistics 
2005-2009 Loan Cohort 
Model 
M1  M2  M3 
Percentage of Level 2 Variance Explained    42.4%  47.8%  47.4% 
Spatial Correlation      0.323  0.364  0.346 
Change in Spatial Correlation from Unconditional Model -0.549  -0.508  -0.526 
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Figure 5.4 Relationship between neighborhood racial composition and probability of 
approval for white and minority applicants for each of the 2005-2009 models 
 
Discussion 
 
The analysis in Chapter 4 attempted to quantify the tract level impact of lending 
decisions on neighborhood racial composition; the current analysis attempted to quantify 
the impact of applicant race and neighborhood racial composition on the likelihood of 
loan approval. The results show that white applicants are more likely to be approved in 
almost all neighborhoods and that neighborhood racial composition matters, but its 
impact is not strictly linear. 
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The study looked at three loan cohorts and each was examined in three ways. The 
first (M1) examined all three cohorts with the same set of variables. The second (M2) 
introduced more neighborhood level variables, and removed any level-2 variables that 
were not strongly associated with the likelihood of approval. The third (M3) examined 
whether neighborhood level variables (neighborhood racial composition and 
neighborhood SES) predicted the impact of applicant race on the likelihood of approval 
(testing for geographic contingent lending). 
While there was some variation in results from loan cohort to loan cohort, the 
predictions of the models generally stayed similar when the relationships between the key 
variables were graphed. White applicants were almost always more likely to be approved, 
and loans in neighborhoods with mixed racial compositions (approximately 50%-80% 
white) had the highest likelihood of approval.  
The results of the neighborhood contingent lending model (M3) for the two earlier 
cohorts (2000-2002, 2003-2004) were similar to those of Holloway’s research. That is, 
lenders did not seem to be making lending decisions based on the race of applicant nor 
the racial composition of the neighborhood alone, but on the interaction between them. 
The third cohort (2005-2009) did not show evidence of neighborhood racial composition 
impacting the likelihood of approval based on race. In this cohort, instead,  neighborhood 
racial composition was consistently important for all applicants (although  increasing 
neighborhood SES did improve the likelihood of white applicant approval).  
While there was a clear importance of neighborhood racial composition on the 
likelihood of approval for many of the models, it is not clear that this phenomenon would 
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be best described as “redlining”. In all models the impact of neighborhood racial 
composition was non-linear and the likelihood of loan approval tended to peak in 
neighborhoods with mixed racial compositions. In some of the models the whitest 
neighborhoods had about the same likelihood of approval as the least white 
neighborhoods. This perhaps would be predicted by research by Wyly and Hammel 
(1999) that showed that mortgage capital was flooding back to innercity neighborhoods. 
In Nashville, lenders do not seem to shy away from investing in non-all white 
neighborhoods, this could be due to the growing tendency of innercity revitalization and 
gentrification within Nashville over the past decade. 
While there does seem to be a statistical bias in favor of white applicants and 
mixed neighborhoods, the limitations of HMDA data means these findings need to be 
interpreted with some caution. Lending decisions are based on more information than is 
available in these analyses, and it could be that confounding variables (e.g., credit score) 
that are not in this data set could account for some of the differences between the 
approval decisions of white and minority applicants. However, since these data are not 
made available by lenders - and that the analysis of the one dataset that included this 
information (the Boston Fed Study) found biases in favor of whites (Munnell, et al., 
1996) – it seems that the burden of proof belongs to those who believe that there is no 
systematic racial bias in lending.  
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CHAPTER VI 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
This dissertation began by introducing the three most widely cited explanations of 
contemporary racial residential segregation.  It then proposed three research questions 
that attempted to explore the adequacy of these explanations. Before exploring the details 
of each question, a close examination of preference-based models of segregation was 
provided in Chapter 2. Chapter 3 described an empirical examination of whether 
homebuyer behavior in the Nashville metropolitan area was in line with what would be 
predicted by preference theorists. The second analysis, examined in Chapter 4, was 
similar to the first, but instead of looking at whether homebuyer locational decisions 
would lead to high levels of segregation, it focused on the lending decisions of banks and 
whether these were having an impact on racial residential segregation. The third analysis, 
which used individual loan applications rather than the aggregated characteristics of 
applicants by year and tract, tested whether lenders seemed to have a pattern of 
discrimination based on the race of applicant, the neighborhood racial composition, or the 
interaction between the two. The method and results of this analysis were described in 
Chapter 5. 
 From a purely theoretical standpoint, preference-based theories provide the most 
coherent explanation of racial residential segregation. The theoretical models that started 
with Schelling (1971), and developed further by Fossett (2006), provide a powerful 
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explanatory tool for why cities may have the high levels of segregation they do, even if 
the majority of households may prefer to live in relatively mixed neighborhoods. 
Fossett’s sophisticated computer program demonstrates that segregation would be the 
“natural” outcome of housing decisions under plausible and empirically based 
assumptions about neighborhood preferences. The thought-provoking results of his and 
Schelling’s theoretical models are described in detail in Chapter 2.  
 While preference-based theories of residential segregation have strong theoretical 
underpinnings, their empirical validation has been elusive. Chapter 3 described the results 
of a study that aims to fill this void by examining whether actual homebuyer decisions 
are in line with what would be predicted by preference-based models of segregation. The 
study, using a spatial hierarchical linear model, examined the percentage of home loan 
applicants who were white in each census tract in each year between 2000 and 2010, and 
compared this to the neighborhood racial composition of the census tract they are 
applying in.  
 Chapter 3 showed that an increasing proportion of applicants were white as the 
neighborhood percentage of whites increased, which was in line with preference-based 
models. However, the overall results suggested that the pattern of home loan applications 
would be more likely to lead to greater integration than greater segregation. This finding 
becomes clear when the predicted proportion of applicants who were white was examined 
by neighborhood racial composition.  
The general pattern of homebuyers examined suggested that mixed and minority 
neighborhoods (a census tract with less than 80% white) would become whiter, while the 
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whitest neighborhoods are predicted to have in-movers that were less white than the 
existing neighborhood racial composition.  If preference-based theories of “neighborhood 
tipping” were correct, one would expect minority and mixed neighborhoods to have a 
profile of applicants less white than those currently residing in the neighborhood, and the 
whitest neighborhoods to have a profile of applicants who were as white or whiter than 
those already residing in the neighborhood.    
 The findings of Chapter 3 suggested that that the theories of Schelling and Fossett 
do not provide an adequate account of the behavior of homebuyers in the Nashville 
metropolitan area during the 2000s. The findings also showed little support for 
socioeconomic based explanations of segregation. While median applicant income was 
positively associated with percentage of applicants who were white, this effect was 
relatively small. Further, neighborhood socio-economic status was negatively associated 
with the percentage of applicants who were white. SES-based explanations would predict 
that as neighborhood status increased so would the percentage of applicants who were 
white. This suggests that the socioeconomic-based explanations, as recently emphasized 
by Brown and Chung (Brown & Chung, 2006; Brown & Chung, 2008; Chung & Brown, 
2007), still fail to account for many aspects of locational decisions by race. 
 It is important to note that Chapter 3 does not attempt to model the effect of racial 
biases in the housing market that may increase segregation. However, the limited support 
for preference and socio-economic based explanations suggests that it would be unwise to 
discount the importance of institutional racial biases in the housing market playing a role 
in maintaining contemporary segregation. These conclusions echo those of Freeman 
(2000) and Adelman (2005), who find that preference and socioeconomic factors are 
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unable to explain the segregation of minorities in the Multi-City Study of Urban 
Inequality data. The following chapter, Chapter 4, explicitly looked into the role of 
lenders in maintaining segregation. 
 The analysis in Chapter 4 explored the influence of lenders on racial residential 
segregation by looking at whether neighborhood racial composition was associated with 
lending decisions making a pool of applicants more or less white. For example, if lenders 
approved a disproportionate share of white applicants in white neighborhoods it would 
suggest a role of lending institutions in maintaining segregation.  
The results provided a complex picture of the relationship between lending 
decisions and neighborhood racial composition.  While lending decisions did not have a 
consistent impact on tracts across time, there was a statistical association between 
neighborhood percent white and the extent that lenders favored/disfavored white 
applicants.  When all control variables were included at their means for each 
neighborhood composition, all neighborhoods saw a positive differential in white 
successful applicants. Neighborhoods that were between 30% and 50% white had the 
strongest impact on the differential approval rate of white applicants. When the impact on 
the actual number of white households moving into a neighborhood was taken into 
account, neighborhoods that had white populations between 60% and 90% saw the 
greatest increase in white households.  The impact of these lending decisions is the 
equivalent of making a census tract six one-hundredths of a percent whiter.  
These findings suggest a minor, if complex, relationship between lending 
decisions and segregation.  They do not, however, provide evidence of racial bias (it 
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could be that the lending decisions are based on widely accepted underwriting criteria). 
Chapter 5 examines the data more closely to see whether there is evidence congruent with 
discrimination that may lead to segregation. 
 Unlike the first two analyses, the third used individual loan applications as the 
basic unit of analysis. It examined whether there is association between applicant race 
and neighborhood racial composition with the likelihood of loan approval, while 
controlling for a number of lender, loan, applicant, and neighborhood characteristics. 
Previous research has suggested that lenders may be more likely to deny applications 
from minority households who are moving into white neighborhoods: a pattern that is in 
line with the results described in Chapter 4. 
 Chapter 5 tested three different racial bias hypotheses: discrimination based on 
the race of applicant, discrimination based on neighborhood racial composition 
(redlining), and discrimination based on the interaction between race of applicant and 
neighborhood racial composition (geographic contingent lending). Due to the size of the 
dataset, the analysis was run in three separate cohorts. In the first two cohorts, including 
data from 2000 through 2004, the results suggested that white applicants were favored in 
all neighborhoods but for those that had almost no white residents. White applicants were 
most likely to be approved in neighborhoods that had between 50% and 80% of their 
residents white. The third cohort of loans, including applications made between 2005 and 
2009, showed evidence of redlining and individual discrimination but not geographic 
contingent lending.  
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 While there are some distinctions between the results found in the three different 
loan cohorts examined in Chapter 5, graphing the results showed that the predictive 
models offer substantially similar conclusions in most cases. White applicants in 
neighborhoods that have residents that are between 50% and 80% white are most likely to 
be approved. Like the findings of the Boston Fed Study (Munnell, et al., 1996),  white 
applicants are favored over minority applicants in nearly all circumstances.  It is clear 
that neighborhood racial composition and applicant race seem to have an impact on the 
likelihood of a loan application approval. However, unlike the findings of Holloway 
(1998) and Holloway and Wyly (2001), it is also clear that applying in the whitest 
neighborhoods does not increase the likelihood of approval (compared to mixed 
neighborhoods). This could be due to the general higher costs associated with many of 
these neighborhoods, making it more difficult to qualify for a loan.  
 The limitation of analysis 3 is that the full information available to lenders is not 
made public through HMDA data, which means that the findings are merely suggestive 
of biases. However, given the consistent findings of bias in favor of white applicants, 
lenders would be wise to provide more information to show that there were legitimate 
financial reasons for a higher rate of approval for white households. 
 In summary, the combination of the analyses presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
indicate that: preference theories do not provide an adequate explanation of the aggregate 
behavior of homebuyers in Nashville; white applicants are more likely to have loans 
approved when compared to non-whites; neighborhood racial composition has an impact 
on lending decisions, but it is not linear. 
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 These results provide a strong empirical critique of Schelling and Fossett’s 
preference models of segregation.  They also provide little support for socioeconomic 
factors being the driver of racial residential segregation. Thus, the ultimate conclusion of 
these analyses suggests that the role of housing institutions in maintaining segregation 
should continue to be examined and extended into a stronger theoretical framework. 
Preference theories have gained their prominence through a highly developed theoretical 
analysis; in contrast, explanations focusing on racial biases tend to have an abundance of 
empirical support but lack a cohesive theoretical framework to tie disparate findings 
together. An inductively built theory, based on findings like those in Chapters 4 and 5 
and the findings of the most recent national Housing Discrimination Study will help 
policy makers understand the relationship between a diffuse pattern of racial biases and 
widespread segregation (much like preference theories are able to tie isolated individual 
decisions to high levels of segregation). Similarly, a stronger theoretical framework 
connecting institutional biases to segregation would help counteract the intuitive appeal 
of socioeconomic explanations that have continued prominence despite very little 
empirical support.  
 As noted in Chapter 1, there is evidence of racial bias at every stage of the 
housing search. This study looks at one particular stage towards the very end of 
homebuyers’ search for housing.  It could be the case that the differential marketing of 
homes based on neighborhood racial composition (M. Collins & Galster, 1995) combined 
with the increase in racial steering by real estate agents (Galster & Godfrey, 2005) and 
the differential treatment by lenders before loan applications are made (Ross, et al., 
2008), could have shaped the racial composition of applicants before the data used in this 
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study is even collected. Further research that examines the actual impact of these patterns 
on the distribution of households by race would buttress and expand upon this present 
study and help provide an empirical framework for theorizing the driving factors of 
contemporary racial residential segregation.  
 One other important finding that was consistent throughout all three analyses was 
the significance of the neighborhood racial composition-neighborhood SES interaction 
control variable.  Higher SES neighborhoods tend to accentuate the importance of 
neighborhood racial composition on each of the dependent variables under study.  While 
the weight of the findings within this study do not show a lot of support for direct 
socioeconomic explanations of racial residential segregation, it is clear that 
socioeconomic neighborhood factors do play a role in racial patterning.  Further 
explorations of the connection between how neighborhood socioeconomic factors interact 
with neighborhood racial composition in determining household and institutional 
decision making as it relates to segregation would be a highly productive area of further 
study. These studies may also provide an opportunity to specifically test the importance 
of SES-based explanations of segregation, something that was beyond the scope of this 
study.   
 At a less grand scale, empirical research on the locational patterns of renters by 
race and the patterns of out-movers (rather than those moving into a neighborhood) 
would help build on the findings of Chapter 3. Closer examination using both quantitative 
and qualitative research methods on the patterns of lending approvals in neighborhoods 
that show consistent patterns of lenders favoring particular racial groups would help flesh 
out the complicated findings presented in Chapters 4 (and, to a lesser extent, Chapter 5). 
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While there seems to be a systematic relationship between neighborhood racial 
composition and the decision making of lenders, traditional notions of redlining, where 
banks withhold credit from mixed and non-white neighborhoods, seem to be out of date. 
Fleshing out the larger consequences of these new lending patterns for urban 
development and the geography of opportunity is an ongoing research project
19
 that 
would help scholars and policy makers develop better approaches to ensuring the original 
goals of fair lending legislation like the Community Reinvestment Act and urban 
revitalization programs like HOPE VI and Choice Neighborhoods are used in the most 
productive way.  
                                                          
19
 Elvin Wyly is a leader in this area 
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APPENDIX 
 
AN EXAMPLE OF CALCULATING CENSUS 2000 CHARACTERISTICS 
FOR 1990 CENSUS GEOGRAPHIES 
 
If 1990 tracts “A” and “B” split into three tracts in 2000: “X”, “Y” and “Z”.  And, all of 
X’s population lived in the geography covered by A, and all of Y’s population was 
contained with B, but Z was split 60/40 between A and B.  
 To calculate A’s population characteristics in 2000: 
o  I added X’s characteristics to 60% of Z’s.  If both X and Z had a white 
population of 100 each in 2000, the newly calculated “A in 2000” would 
have a white population of 160 (i.e., all of X’s and 60% of Z’s white 
population).  
 To calculate median income and median home value 
o  I multiplied the median value by the percentage of the census tracts 
population that made up the original 1990 tract.  For example, if tract X 
(median income = $40,000) made up 75% of A and tract Z (median 
income = $50,000) made up the remaining 25%, then I multiplied each by 
its proportion of the 1990 tract and then added those two numbers 
together.  In this case it would be $40,000 x .75 (i.e., $30,000) + $50,000 x 
.25 (i.e., $12,500) = $42,500. 
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